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1. Background, Research Questions, Scope and Methodology 
1.1. The Evolution of the Revolution: Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law 
It is a firmly established notion that competition law and regulations are  “a matter public policy” 
as stipulated by TFEU and therefore in the terminology of the ECJ.12 The implementation of 
Private enforcement of EU Competition law, that is, an enforcement by means of a legal action 
brought to court by a private victim of an anticompetitive behaviour3, although often compared 
to public enforcement, was also accepted to be a matter of “public policy” after the initial 
developments on the damages actions. This policy choice became visible in the Commission’s 
White paper in 2006 where a reference was made to the development of a “competition culture” 
and thereby sending strong signals of involving private plaintiffs in the EU Competition Law 
enforcement4. 
Just a few years before the publication of the White Paper which lead to the damage’s directive 
of 20145,  the direct effect6 of TFEU Art. 101 and Art. 102 were distinctly recognised by ECJ 
in its Courage and Crehan 7 decision8. The principal question asked to court was whether a 
harmed party to an illegal contract who is liable of restricting and distorting competition could 
claim damages from the other contracting party. The court has confirmed the distinct right of 
individuals who were harmed by unfair competition practices to claim compensation for 
 
1 Niamh Dunne, The Role of Private Enforcement within EU Competition Law, The Dickson Poon School of Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, paper no. 2014-37 (2014). p.1. 
2 C-295/04 to C-298/04, Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA (C-295/04), Antonio Cannito v 
Fondiaria Sai SpA (C-296/04) and Nicolò Tricarico (C-297/04) and Pasqualina Murgolo (C-298/04) v Assitalia 
SpA. ECR-2006 I-06619. (Manfredi) 
3 David Ashton, Competition Damages Actions in the EU. (Elgar 2018) p.2. 
4 White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 2.4.2008 COM(2008). SEC(2008) 404-
406.p.3. (White paper). The Commission discusses the welfare contributions of a “competition culture” thereby 
indicating the involvement of private parties in the EC Competition Law enforcement. 
5 Directive 2014/104/EU,  26 November 2014, on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law 
for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union. Art.3. 
(Damages Directive). 
6 Direct effect refers to enabling of individuals to invoke rights from European acts immedietaly before a national 
court. 
7 Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others. ECR 2001 I-
06297. Paras 26-29.(Courage). 
8 Although the Articles 85 (101TFEU) and 86 (102TFEU) of TEU were implied to be safeguarded by the courts in 
the earlier “Belgische Radio en Televisie v SV SABAM” case. Case 127-73 Belgische Radio en Televisie and société 
belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs v SV SABAM and NV Fonior, para 3. 
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suffered damages and reiterated the principle of effectiveness9. To achieve the full effectiveness 
of Art 10110 ECJ tasked the national court with calculation and assessing the extent of the 
damages arising from an EU competition law infringement.11 The decision was later revisited 
and confirmed in Pfleiderer as well.12 
 
In tandem with the legislative efforts, the development of private enforcement continued in the 
court with the “Manfredi”13 case. The Crehan judgement had already set out the causation 
requirement and with this case ECJ moved onto address other issues related to standing14, 
limitation periods15, types of damages16, principals on the quantum of the damages1718, and 
equally important, reiterated the requirement of “full compensation” from the earlier 
Marshall(II) case19.The requirement was later recognized in the White paper in 200820 as a 
principle, and later became a distinct right under the Damages Directive.21  
 
These decisions were critical developments where the court acknowledged that unfair 
competition practices can equally harm private parties and where the inflicted harm can be 
shown and shown to be causally linked to the actions of the infringing party, the harm can be 
 
9 Ibid, para 27. Prinmciple of effectiveness : The principle of effectiveness,  prohibits  the Member State courts to 
apply national remedies and procedural rules in a way that  renders claims based on EU law impossible in practice 
or excessively difficult to enforce. 
10 Art 81, later was reformulated as Art (101). 
11 Courage v. Crehan decision was lacking any clear instructions on damages proceedings and more so with the 
quantification of damages.11After the return of the proceedings to England the High court noted that the issues 
relating to damages were not argued before the House of Lords, and consequently did not arise for decision.11 This 
not only delayed the proceedings but signalled that effective application of competition law provision could not 
take place without due attention given to the procedural hinders especially on the type and quantum of the damages 
as these were not even argued in court. 
12 Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt (2011) para.28. 
13 Manfredi , para31. 
14 Ibid, para 70-72. 
15 Ibid, para 78-79. 
16 Ibid, para 84-85. 
17 Ibid, para 88. 
18 Ibid, para 95. 
19 Niamh Dunne, The Role of Private Enforcement within EU Competition Law, The Dickson Poon School of Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, paper no. 2014-37 (2014). p.10. See Case C-271/91, M. Helen Marshall v 
Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority. ECLI:EU:C:1993:335 (Marshall II). 
20 White paper. (n. 4). 
21 Damages Directive, (n. 5). 
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compensated in full. These principles formed the backbone of the legislative efforts and have 
made their way into the Damage’s Directive of 2014.22 Following Manfredi, It had become clear 
that private enforcement was no longer in “its infancy”23. 
 
Meanwhile, after the decentralisation of the competition enforcement and introduction of 
Regulation 1/2003, the Commission and the member states were equipped with additional 
powers, and NCAs and national courts have become active actors in the application of TFEU 
Art 101 and Art 102.24 From this point onwards, the necessity of  clearer procedural guidelines 
became evident and the Ashurst report in 2004 has made the first attempt to patch the procedural 
shortcomings of the private actions. The report laid out the empirical economic models and 
methods applicable for damages quantification based on the limited amount of cases.25 The but-
for comparator models which are relied heavily for quantification today were firstly mentioned 
in this report26. In contrast to the AG opinion in Manfredi case, the report underlined the state 
of underdevelopment in private actions and pointed at contradictions between national-EU law 
and obstacles before the principle of full compensation. 
 
 The modernization27 continued with the Commission Green Paper in 200528. The type of 
damages, indirect purchaser standing and passing-on were consulted with the stakeholders.29 
The development gained a further momentum with the White paper issued in 2008.30 After these 
 
22 Damages Directive, (n. 5), recital 11. 
23 Manfredi , Opinion AG. 
24 Council Regulation (Ec) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. Art 5,6. (Regulation 2003). 
25 Ashurst Report, Study On The Conditions Of Claims For Damages In Case Of Infringement Of EC Competition 
Rules Analysis Of Economic Models For The Calculation Of Damages. (2004) (Ashurst Report). P4. These 
methods are studied further in this study. 
26 Ibid, Report is based on the objective of returning the plaintiff to the position but for the infringement. 
27 Dunne (n 1), p.7. Dunne believes the modernization which referred to regulatory developments is now slowly 
turning into a more economic approach (effects approach). 
28 Green Paper, Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules (presented by the Commission) SEC(2005) 
1732. Section 2.3. (Green Paper). 
29 Indirect purchaser refers to any purchaser down the supply chain who may allegedly be passed on an overcharge 
as a result of competition law infringement. 
30 White paper (2008) para 1.2. 
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consultations, the tasks assigned to EU competition law31 were clearer and the deterrent effect 
of compensatory justice was acknowledged.  
 
After a silent period, in 201332, the unbinding Staff working Document “Practical guide to 
Quantification of Damages” was published.33 While reiterating the former established principle 
of full compensation, it also gave further insights on the application of quantification methods.  
In the same year, the long-awaited proposal for Damages directive finally arrived and was 
signed into law at the end of 2014.34  
 
Nevertheless, in conformity with the principle of effectiveness, and given the diversity in 
national remedial rules, the inherent limitations among the national legislations have led the 
Commission to refrain from producing restrictive guidelines to ensure the practice of these 
methods do not become “practically impossible or excessively difficult”. Despite the generally 
accepted notions that competition infringements cause harm to many private parties as well as 
society as a whole, and that damage that can be measured, and shown to be causally linked to 
the infringement can be compensated, the current  development of EU legislation is not yet clear 
enough to ensure legal certainty or to “sufficiently” facilitate the recovery of  damages. Issues 
centred around the steps before the quantification of damages, such as the “sufficient extent” of 
the causality to be considered established, or the extent of the damage to be considered “fully 
compensated” are not clearly defined. 35 
 
Furthermore, in the application of the principle of effectiveness, the extent of claimant 
friendliness, i.e. the discretion of the national courts in the application of the EU law, is left open 
and often ambiguous use cases of the word effectiveness, causal link, or quantification methods 
are encountered. The numerous legal instruments available to the national courts combined with 
 
31 See section 2.1.2. above  
32 Dunne (n 1). P.12. Niamh Dunne mentions in her paper the leaking of the proposal for Directive and it including 
provisions on collective reddress mechanisms and the exclusion of parliement caused silence. 
33 SWD (2013) 205 Commission Staff Working Document, Practical Guide Quantifying Harm In Actions For 
Damages Based On Breaches Of Article 101 Or 102 Of The Treaty On The Functioning Of The European 
Union(Guidance on Quantification). Para. 17. 
34 Damages directive. 
35 In the Damages actions most of the problems seem to occur before the cases reach to the quantification phase, 
i.e. the part that the subtantive law is applied.Hence the choice of the title of the study. 
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their interchangeable interpretation of the tasks assigned the EU competition law and in 
particular private enforcement, creates confusing situations and uncertainty for all parties 
involved in actions for damages. The need for scholars to repeatedly revert to older Commission 
publications/working papers to understand the roots of the new provisions is what the author 
believes to be “sufficient” evidence that there is some level of confusion present in this field. 
This is exactly what this study will be focusing on; to demonstrate the shortcomings of the 
substantive law as well as practical implementation of Private Enforcement in EU. 
 
1.2. Research Questions, Delimitation and Structure   
1.2.1.  Research Questions and Delimitation 
The main research question that will be addressed in the following chapters is how a victim of 
competition law infringement can, effectively, bring an action for damages in court. The 
question will be answered by demonstrating the obstacles and ambiguities in the step by step 
application of EU substantive law in the damages actions at the national level, as well as by 
scrutinizing the tasks assigned to Private enforcement of EU competition law and EU 
competition law in general. Furthermore, the available legal instruments and methods of 
quantification will be assessed in relation to the complexities or shortcoming they may produce 
during actions for damages. Identified obstacles will also be placed in context of recent national 
case law. By so doing, this study aims to establish patterns for result oriented damages actions. 
 
In the analysis, due attention will also be paid to the perspectives of defendants or individuals 
who are prone to become victims of competition law infringements. It should be mentioned that 
this analysis is made based not only on the latest legislation, Damages Directive of 2014, but on 
all relevant sources of EU law in relation to actions for damages. The Directive itself contains 
references to EU legal principles and earlier case law, and thus its application cannot be 
complete without the surrounding sources of law.36 In other words, the identified ambiguities or 
obstacles may be the result of the intertwinement of many different sources and levels of EU 
law such as EU principles, EU case law, EU legislation, national law and available remedies.37 
 
36 See Section. 2.4. 
37 Aspects related to evidence will mostly be left out given the harmonization level achieved in the Damages 
Directive. 
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Additional references will also be made to US legislation and case law in order to review and 
gain insights from similar scenarios with different approaches. 
 
Regarding the terminology, the key word. “effectiveness” for this study refers to overcoming an 
identified obstacle or an ambiguity resulting from the different interpretation/application of EU 
law at the national level. In other words, “effectiveness” is not a narrow interpretation of the EU 
“principle of effectiveness” although, it may refer to the same meaning as the principle has a 
positive meaning as to rendering the application of EU law possible. Therefore, the same word 
will be used interchangeably depending on the context and will be made clear to the reader 
where necessary. 
 
1.2.2. Structure 
The research questions will be answered based on the following 5 chapters. The first chapter 
presents the reader with background information on the development of Private enforcement in 
EU from both the historical and factual point of view, focused on case law and the development 
of EU legislation. The identified issue from the ongoing efforts to improve the application of 
Private enforcement is laid as a research question and the limitations and structure of the study 
is determined with the appropriate methodology to conduct the research.  
 
Chapter two will examine competition law in its general application and specifically in the EU. 
Firstly, competition law and its goals are explained in a general sense. The differing legal cases 
of competition law and its enforcement mechanisms are analysed from the perspective of 
efficiency and effectiveness. Consequently, the chapter looks thoroughly into the tasks assigned 
to private enforcement of competition law and examines its objectives in EU. The 
interchangeable or combined uses of the tasks for different policy goals are analysed from the 
perspective of the damages actions and the “road to quantification” is examined for ambiguities 
and obstacles. Lastly, the available legal tools in effect are examined. 
 
Third chapter looks thoroughly into the quantification phase of damages actions where firstly 
the types of damages and individuals who are potentially prone to be victims of infringements 
are studied. After the identification of the general characteristics of damages, a thorough 
 7 
 
examination is done on the methods of quantification for their shortcomings and correct use 
cases. The examination also addresses instances where the current competition regime in the 
EU fails to substantially tackle infringements, as well as noting various examples where 
overcompensation and passing-on situations can falsely be evaluated. The insights gained in this 
chapter are put further in use in the fourth chapter. 
 
Fourth chapter is focused on practical examples of competition infringement in EU case law. 
The cases examined are mostly from the member states that are keen on accepting jurisdiction 
in actions for damages38. A comparative study on standing issues surrounding the establishment 
on the extent of harm, causal link, passing on and the application of the quantification methods 
is used to illustrate the lack of legal certainty in the aforementioned issues. And particular 
attention will be given to the application of the tasks assigned to private enforcement of 
competition law in the corresponding jurisdiction, which will be used to draw conclusions to 
their interoperability.  
 
The fifth section will overview conclusions on the assessment made on the previous chapters 
and establish patterns that lead to the ambiguous application of competition law or obstacles 
and impairments to effective enforcement of actions for damages associated with infringements 
of competition law. 
 
1.3. Methodology 
The legal methodology used for the study is the legal dogmatic method. While there is not a 
general definition to this methodology, it is deemed to be a suitable model in studying a system 
based on the dynamics and systematics from inside.39 In other words, dogmatic method brings 
clarity as it allows to analyse and understand the EU system as a whole and not fragmented into 
member states. The explanation and clarification system provide are essential to identify the 
shortcomings for the purposes of this study. This method will also allow to systemize the legal 
choices and norms within the meaning of this study and help establish patterns. The available 
 
38 The author’s language knowledge is also  relevant in the choice of case law. 
39 Jan M. Smits, What Is Legal Doctrine? On the Aims and Methods of Legal-Dogmatic Research, p.5. 
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legal tools, i.e. Damages Directive, Guidance on quantification, national and EU case law as 
well as semantical choices of the courts on EU principles will be interpreted and examined in 
this context.  
 
Another suitable method may be said to exist is the European legal method. Parallel to the 
dogmatic method, it also provides a normative look into the system as a whole. Hesselink40 
contends that the use of European legal method is a very smart idea and a necessary one because 
a normative system must have a debate or discourse based on its normative assumptions. EU 
law in this regard is a very different and uncharacteristic system; and a comparison with other 
legal systems cannot be made the same way that it would be possible between two different 
member states. Nevertheless, since legal dogmatic method is useful and suitable to attain the 
goals of this study and given the similarity between the two methods for the purposes of this 
study, the legal dogmatic method is preferred. 
 
In the second part of the study normative theory will be utilized to understand if there would be 
a more suitable regulatory option based on the findings of the study.41 Normative theory deals 
with theoretical and policy considerations and, in that, it’s different from legal dogmatic theory, 
which deals more with positive dimensions. The positive dimension is less abstract and mostly 
concerned with the interpretation of the normative regulations into positive legal rules.42 For 
this reason, the normative theory is more suitable to analyse the outcomes of the comparative 
study and contrast them with the policy choices studied in the first part of the study.43  
 
Furthermore, in the section studying the empirical quantification methods of damages, some 
economic considerations are also involved in identifying obstacles. These methods cannot 
 
40 Martijn W. Hesselink, A European Legal Science? On European private law and scientific method, Centre for 
the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series No. 2008/02, p.37. 
41 Second part of the study refers to  chapter 3 and beyond , as from that part onwards there is no longer the need 
to study the substantive law, and its the starting point of the comparative study. 
42 Benedict Sheehy, And Donald Feaver, Designing Effective Regulation: A Normative Theory, UNSW Law 
Journal Volume 38(1) p.392. 
43 The short conclusions drawn in section 2.3. will assess outcomes of the dogmatic method utilized in the first part 
of the study in section 4. ’Practical insights“ 
. 
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adequately be assessed based on the methods mentioned above, nor are they meant to. 
Economics may help law to understand and justify the conclusions it draws based on legal 
research, and this is the extent its used for the purposes of this study. As Siems44 contends, any 
further attempts to use interdisciplinary approaches for legal research when a certain narrowness 
is confronted, may cause other narrownesses. 
 
2. Framework in Development, Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law 
2.1. Competition Law Enforcement 
Economic theory of optimal deterrence holds that expected fine should equal the harm 
inflicted.45A similar balance is also sought in competition law enforcement and reaching the 
goals of competition policy. In the pursuit of an optimum competition law enforcement, a 
combination of state authorities and private parties must act together and interchangeably46. 
Public enforcement is when the state’s watchdog suspects or is alerted regarding a breach of 
competition law and takes action to suspend and punish the infringer, while private enforcement, 
takes place when a private entity suffers damage as a result of a similar infringement and turns 
to the other party for compensation. A short formulation like above may suffice to describe both 
mechanisms, but traditionally, the dichotomy of public and private enforcement is not a feature 
unique to antitrust. It goes beyond the mere meaning of “set of rules” both in the public and 
private sphere and formulates the roles assigned to the state and the citizens to implement the 
law.47This relationship between the public and private entities help reach different goals of 
competition policy more efficiently by different mechanisms. 
 
44 Mathias M Siems, A World Without Law Professors. Methodologies of Legal Research. What Kind of Method 
for What Kind of Discipline? Hart 2011, P.84 
45 Wouter P. J. Wils, Yearbook of European Law, Volume 15, Issue 1, “To Deter or Not to Deter” 1995, p.17. 
46Optimum enforcement of competition law refers to the best balance of the use case of either enforcement 
mechanism in the attainment of decision in a given case. 
47 Assimakis P. Komninos, “Relationship between Public and Private Enforcement: quod Dei Deo, quod Caesaris 
Caesari” 16th Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop (2011). p.1. 
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2.1.2. The Different Use Cases of Efficient Enforcement Mechanisms. Why We Need 
Private Enforcement and Why We Don’t? 
The roles of both the state and the citizen take form based on the four tasks broadly assigned to 
competition law enforcement.48 Some scholars believe that these tasks can be assigned to both 
mechanisms, but most of the time, there is an evident separation in the abilities of one 
mechanism over the other. 49Speaking from a general perspective, it is appropriate to make a 
comparison to map out which mechanism is a better fit for the given duty. 
 
Competition law regulations need proactive adjustment as the societal opinion, and the market 
realities may evolve in time parallel to the developments in the technology and other societal 
influences. Therefore, the initial duty should be to develop and clarify competition law 
regulations50. The legislative mechanisms are usually keen on taking on this task as well, but 
not as good and effective as public enforcement actors. The NCA’s and courts possess more use 
case examples and are more efficient and proportionate than legislative mechanisms. 
Furthermore, in terms of communication channels and liaison with other governmental 
authorities, public actors are equipped with all the necessary privileges in the passing of the 
information.  Private actors on the other hand, usually do not have enough incentive to address 
a societal issue or do not opt for optimal enforcement or pursue competition law goals, but rather 
settle.51Additionally, if the private actor is litigating a follow-on damages action, it is usually 
based on the earlier decision of public judicial actors which demonstrates that efficiencies lie 
with the public judicial actors.52 Nevertheless, private enforcement can still fulfil this task to 
some extent and the stand-alone cases are likely to contribute to the general development of 
competition regulations53. The limitation however is that they would reflect a specific aspect of 
a general interest in society which needs thorough evaluation in light of the pool of experiences 
 
48 Wouter, P.J Wils. World Competition, Volume 32, No. 1,(2009) p.6 Originally he speaks of 3 tasks. It was 
combined with a 4th from the author of this study. 
49 Komninos (n 47).  
50 Wils, (n 45) p.7. 
51 Wouter, P.J Wils, Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe ? World Competition, Volume 
26, Issue 3, (September 2003). p 
52Wils, (n 45) p.7 
53Ibid, Wils explains Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner v Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-7817 which led to an injunctive relief, 
but claims number of cases are of insignificant numbers. 
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from public enforcers. The latter fact points out the continuous dependence of the private actors 
to public decision making and their relative unfitness for this duty.  
 
The second duty is the injunctive function of the enforcement.54 Private parties may request 
injunction orders from the court or NCAs to stop an alleged violation of competition law. While 
the execution of the order obviously is a task for public enforcement, private parties may also 
contribute as complainants. The order may indeed stop a violation or can be used in positive 
sense to cease a similar violation in the future55 but, injunctions also have the potential to be 
used as a sword by private parties56. In this sense it seems that involvement of both mechanisms 
is necessary to fulfil the duty, however with an optimum balance, to prevent abusive injunctions 
and losses for other private parties. 
 
The third duty is the prevention of violations i.e. deterrence and punishment task. It can be 
characterized by ex-ante regulation for the deterrence and prevention aspects and ex-post 
regulation for the punitive side of enforcement.57 The deterrence task may receive some 
contribution from private enforcement as the damages would form an additional burden on top 
of the punishments.58 Nevertheless, some social costs also occur in the society as there will  
always be victims who do not or cannot sue due to limited sources or unattributable awards to 
damages. Similarly, if a social justice system would depend on private enforcement, some 
individuals would take a “free ride” and wait for other victims for enforcement.59Ex-ante 
regulation may become abused by the private entities by opting in a trade-off situation of 
expected benefits versus the expected costs of violations , thereby indicating potential abusive 
outcomes on the side of private enforcement.60 Public enforcement on the other hand can 
perform these tasks more efficiently for two reasons: due to wider investigative powers, and due 
 
54 Komninos,( n 47). p.3. 
55 Ibid. 
56Wils, (n 45) p.3. 
57Wils, (n 45) p.8 
58Ibid. p.9. 
59 Roger van den Bergh, Willem van Boom, Marc van der Woude Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands, 
The EC Green Paper on Damages Actions in Antritrust Cases An Academic Comment, 2006, p.5. 
60Wils, (n 45) p.8 
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to more extensive sanctions, where not only damages based monetary sanctions but also prison 
sanctions are available.61 
 
Lastly, is the corrective justice task through compensation. This task appears at its face to be a 
task for the private enforcers due to the accuracy of the damage only the affected private party 
can be acquainted with. While being mostly true, it does not make the role of public enforcement 
involvement inexistent.62 In some jurisdictions, the public enforcers may take upon themselves 
the task to bring an action for damages on behalf of the victims.63 The same may also be put in 
motion in the form of a payment scheme issued by the public enforcers.64 Furthermore, taking 
away benefits of a violation may also be understood within the meaning of the “corrective 
justice”, i.e. disgorgement65 which is undeniably a task for the public enforcers.  
 
Speaking of the efficiencies, some of the tasks mentioned above seem to be fulfilled 
interchangeably. An exception to the rule can be said to exist in the public enforcers’ 
involvement in compensatory justice, more specifically quantification phase of damages cases. 
Issues such as of proving causation and the damages quantification are distinct tasks that should 
only be assigned to private enforcement of competition law.66 The public enforcers' position as 
a neutral state authority should be maintained and not jeopardized by tasking them with damages 
quantification. In an erroneous quantification session, the impartiality of state will become 
questioned, and the public authority may unintentionally end up serving private interests.6768In 
 
61Ibid. p.10. 
62 Komninos,( n 47). p.3. 
63 Ibid. Referred jurisdictions are France and United States. 
64 Ibidem. 
65Wils, (n 45).p.14. Wils underlines that disgorgement and compensation may overlap within the meaning of 
corrective justice as right to compensation also supports the deterrence task, at least when awarded . See also for 
further clarification:  Kent Roach and Michael J. Trebilcock, Private Enforcement of Competition Laws, Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal Volume 34, Number 3 (Fall 1996). p.496. See also Andrea Renda, et.al. Making antitrust damages 
actions more effective in the EU: welfare impact and potential scenarios Final Report, (2007) (Impact Report) p. 
78. 
66 Ibid, p.15 
67 Komninos,( n 47). p.23. 
68 One may also indicate that an errounous quantification can also be a result of a court session. This is true however, 
there is the possibility to rebut the quantification in different ways. A task assigned to competition authorities to 
quantify on behalf of the victim would severely limit the rebuttal possibilities. 
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the ideal situation, public enforcers choose to focus only on the anti-competitive effects of a 
case, rather than the quantification of the harm the same anti-competitive action has inflicted.69 
A supporting view from an European perspective in the ECJ case T-Mobile Netherlands BV et 
al. v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, states following the 
detection of an anti-competitive conduct that “Whether and to what extent, in fact, such 
anticompetitive effects result can only be of relevance for determining the amount of any fine 
and assessing any claim for damages”  thereby ruled out and public involvement in the 
quantification phase of damages actions.70 
 
Public and private enforcement can complement each other. Corrective justice and 
compensation apparently can better be achieved by means of private enforcement and to some 
degree by means of disgorgement. On the other hand, the deterrent effect which private 
enforcement may create would depend on the trade-off situation the infringing party may 
consider, and as Wils suggests it can be better achieved by punitive damages. According to Wils 
the use case of private enforcement as deterrent factor is an unnecessary addition to the 
sanctioning instrument, as the same effect or even more deterrent factor can be achieved by just 
raising the amount of fines.71 Another analogy can also be made to discourage private 
enforcement in remote cases that require lengthy procedures or minor damages cases.72Given 
the superiority of public enforcement mechanism over the private actions, the sources can better 
be invested in public enforcement for the sake of efficiency.7374Similarly, when obstacles pile 
up during damages actions where the elements necessary to establish harm suffered or no direct 
causality can be established, reallocating sources to enhance the public enforcement system can 
achieve better overall result.75 This preference choice aligns closely with the European Union 
principle of “Subsidiarity”, where a decision is impossible to be made close to the citizen, a 
better overall result can be achieved at the EU level.76 
 
69 Komninos,(n 1). p.24. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Wils (n. 45) p.484. 
72 Katri Havu, Causation and Damage: What the Directive Does Not Solve and Remarks on Relevant EU Law  EU 
Competition Litigation 1st edition May 2019, p.194 
73 Ibid. 
74 Wils (n. 45) p.484. 
75 Havu (n.72) p.194. 
76 Principle of Subsidiarity TEU Art 5(3) 
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2.2. Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the European Union and Assigned 
Tasks 
2.2.1. Envisaged tasks for Private Enforcement in EU  
Already in 2001, Mario Monti, the European Commissioner for Competition Policy signalled 
the ultimate goals of the commission on private enforcement to the European community. The 
envisaged system was centred around three main topics which can be grouped in two relevant 
topics for private enforcement.77  
 
Monti clearly dropped the discussion pertaining the necessity of the private enforcement and 
paved the way for the enforcement of competition law to become a combined effort among 
Commission, national courts and the competition authorities, as well as to utilize both 
enforcement mechanisms to complement each other. The approach in theory would stop the 
infringements, strengthen competition law rules which should contain “effective” remedies, and 
give widespread access to the latter for obtaining compensation.  
 
The tasks thereby assigned to private enforcement were first, to help fulfil the competition 
enforcement’s injunctive function by stopping infringements78, and second, fostering the private 
enforcement’s complementary functions by giving Articles 81 and 8279 a local application in 
the hands of NCAs. The latter task would help fulfil the duty of clarification of prohibitions; 
and the practice of the deterrence function of enforcement through Ex-ante regulation.80  
 
The second emphasis laid was the importance of the decentralization and effective application 
of the corrective task of competition enforcement. Principle of full compensation, economic 
analysis and balancing of interests were already acknowledged.81 The ambiguity pertaining the 
 
77 Mario Monti, Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, Sixth EU Competition Law and Policy 
Workshop (June 2001). p.2. 
78 See section 2.1.2. 
79 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
80 See section 2.1.2. 
81 Monti (n. 77) p.2-3. 
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EU – national law intertwinements seem to have been acknowledged and the proposed solution 
was a creative decision making during the balancing between EU and the national provisions82.  
 
2.2.2. Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the European Union 
In line with the envisaged tasks above, the Commission feels that private enforcement is one of 
two pillars of EU competition law.83 The ideal of bringing competition closer to 
citizens84combined with the view of the Commission meant that the goals of private 
enforcement came to complement public enforcement, thereby contributing to deterrence effect, 
and full compensation of victims,85 which thereby, realized the corrective task of competition 
law, thus bringing competition law closer to citizens. This is interesting, as the principal 
objective pursued by the claim for antitrust damages is corrective justice and compensation, and 
not deterrence.86 
 
In connection with the aforementioned, to ensure the effective application of EU Competition 
law rules and the direct effect of Art 101 and Art 102 of TFEU87 every individual, including 
companies, have the right to start action for damages.88 Actions for damages is regulated in most 
aspects by the Damages Directive, EU principles of effectiveness and equality combined with 
case law which provides clarification and guidance. Procedural steps for a successful claim or 
defence, the application of the principles, however, are not sufficiently clear as well as the 
establishment of sufficient extent of damages, or causal link to proceed to the quantification 
phase of actions for damages. These aspects will be studied analysed the following sections. 
 
 
82 See further section 2.2.2 
83 Ibid, p.6 
84 Green Paper (2005) see 1.1 
85 Also interesting to read the contradiction that full compensation has become the “ultimate goal of “private 
enforcement in the Commissions White paper issued in 2008, while in the same paper, the tasks assigned to 
competition law were also confirmed and an acknowledgement of the benefits compensatory justice to deterrence 
and the competition system as a whole were included.  
86 Ioannis Lianos, Causal Uncertainty and Damages Claims for Infringement of Competition Law in Europe, CLES 
Research Paper Series 2/2015, p.7 
87 Courage,  
88 See section 2.2.3. for ’fairness“ the idea behind the inclusive approach. 
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2.2.3. Concept of effectiveness - Fair Effectiveness? 
The EU Principle of Effectiveness means national remedies and procedural law must not render 
the exercise of EU law “practically impossible or excessively difficult”.89 The principle allows 
the assumption ‘any individual who suffered harm with a causal relationship between that harm 
and an agreement or practice prohibited under competition articles in TFEU, can claim 
compensation’ to be interpreted in the light of EU rules to ensure compliance of the national 
court with EU law.90 In reality though, the concept of effectiveness in damages claims is 
confusingly vague. For this reason, the interpretation of the principle of effectiveness has been 
elaborated at length by the ECJ and further spin-off notions of “effectiveness” are found 
necessary to emphasize91. Among these are, the effective application of competition law, 
practical effect of competition articles, full effectiveness, effective enforcement and effective 
judicial protection. The relationship among these notions do not follow a logical explanation 
and requires clarification to fully grasp the effectiveness factor.92 
Broadly speaking, the discussions on multiple ECJ cases about effectiveness centre around or 
spin-off from the dismay of EU law application at national level. Various ways the questions 
present themselves in court seem to necessitate different terminology to emphasize the 
importance of “effective application of EU law” and ideally to fully comply with EU 
competition provisions. The reason that sends most scholars to ponder the various meanings 
behind the notions may be the mentions made of multiple terminology in the same case analysis.  
 
However, at a closer glance, it becomes apparent that the use of various effectiveness 
terminology is mostly made in connection to the principle of effectiveness; that is, removing all 
 
89 Manfredi , para 71. 
90 Ibid,para 61. 
91 See Courage , paras 25-29. The Court refers to first the rules to take „full effect“, followed by „practical effect“; 
same terminology was reiterated in Manfredi (n 33), paras 60,62 and 64.See also Case C-557/12  Kone AG and 
Others v ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG C:2014:1317 (Kone) paras 21, 25 and 26. Court refers to the The full effectiveness 
of Article 101 TFEU and, in particular, the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in paragraph 1 of the Article, 
and  also principle of effectiveness and effective application of competiton law rules.See further C‑536/11 Donau 
Chemie and Others EU:C:2013:366 para 21.the terminology „practical effect“ used becomes circular by referring 
back to Manfredi case where no clarification is made by the court. 
92 Havu, (n.72) p.193. 
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the barriers before the application of EU law provisions to practice the right to damages.93The 
effort spent by the ECJ in this meaning may also outline the sanctions duty it assigns to the 
private enforcement system.94In a more plain sentence, application of EU law with an effective 
factor may mean a successful damages claim where the claimant is compensated in the full 
amount claimed, even though such situation may include elements of overcompensation and 
inefficiencies in the society as a whole.9596 The interchangeable use of these various notions 
indicates that a court is expected to consider an extensive list of EU terminology to fit the case 
in hand for a successful damages claim.97 
 
In any case, for the purposes of this study, the interchangeable use of terminology will indicate 
the effective factor of the national courts. In other words, the level of effort put by the court to 
evaluate the case based on the above-mentioned notions, will considered to be an effective 
application of EU law. This also indicates that courts when making use of all available tools and 
interpretations are applying a “fair effectiveness”, to provide relief to all parties involved in 
cases. 98Below, first an attempt will be made to describe the notions for further use later in the 
study. 
 
In the Courage case, the notions of “practical effect” and “full effectiveness” were noted. In the 
pursuit of obtaining damages from a competition infringement i.e. reliance on EU law, the court 
 
93 See Courage, paras 29-31the principle of effectiveness is emphasized along side the principle of equivalance. 
Paras, 25-26 the full and practical effects of competition provisions are discussed. See also for example (Kone) 
paras 21, 24 and 25. 
94 See Section2.1.2 where the various duties assigned to private enforcement law were discussed.Sanctions duty 
may be best fulfilled by public enforcement mechanisms. See Wils  p.484.Furthermore, the incentive to perform 
sanctions duty by the private enforcement system maybe missing as it pursues a specific mission on its own. See 
also Havu, (n.72) p.194.The sanctions task was however, was seen as an indispensible part of the private 
enforcement in case Francovich. See: Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90. ECLI:EU:C:1991:428 Andrea Francovich 
and Danila Bonifaci and others v Italian Republic. 
95 See Damages Directive (2014) Recital 13, Art 3 , full compensation does not mean overcompensation within the 
meaning of the Directive. See section 4.1. for an overcompensation situation. 
96 Also note that in case Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt EU:C:2011:389, para 26, the Court sees 
the admission of leniency documents to those seeking damages as an inefficiency for the competition system.An 
overcompensation situation that might have occured is not preferred and not seen as an effective application of EU 
law nor can that be considered a goal of damages liability in EU competition law. 
97 See Havu, (n.72) p.194. where she mentione an implied duty of the national courts to opt for an extensive scope 
of damages. 
98 See also section 2.2.3. 
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used the notion of full effect in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness and principle of 
equivalence. It might also be argued that a reference was indirectly made to “effective judicial 
protection”.99100The same notions were also noted in Manfredi101 case, and again and were 
directly tied to acting in conformity of the two closely connected principles. Within the meaning 
of effectiveness, the significance of practical effect, full effectiveness, principle of effectiveness, 
effective judicial protection, and, principle of equivalence due to its close proximity with 
principle effectiveness, is seemingly considered the same and with the same goal of facilitating 
the principle of effectiveness. 
 
The use of the notion of “effective enforcement” on the other hand, can be referring to a different 
meaning depending on the purpose of the use case and the recoverability of damages. Firstly, 
when the public enforcement mechanisms are fulfilling the deterrence and punitive task, 
effective enforcement may refer to national courts to proceed expeditiously and to grant citizens 
rapid access to national redress mechanisms102. This may preclude or exclude some of the 
national procedural requirements to guarantee compliance with EU law. This interpretation also 
holds true within the meaning of the concept of “effective judicial protection”103, as the EU law 
does not directly deal with the effectiveness factor of judicial protection.104  The effective factor 
 
99 See Courage, para 25. The court refers to the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, and that the procedural 
autonomy must not hinder the application of competition provisions. In para 26 court reiterates the Article 85(1) in 
the meaning that the disapplication of the article is not open for discussion, thereby tying it to principle of 
effectiveness. 
100 Effective judicial protection remains relevant in each damages case given that a claim is objectively justified. 
In this case, as a matter of EU law, the road was paved for a damages claim therefore, indirectly indicated a judicial 
protection.Furthermore, The court referred in para 25 cases Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, para 16, and  
C-213/89 Factortame [1990] ECR I-2433 para 19, where a clear reference was made to the protection of rights 
alongside the applicability of EU law under the priciple of effectiveness. 
101 Manfredi (n 33), para 60-63. 
102 (2017/C 18/02) Communication From The Commission, EU law: Better results through better application. 2017. 
p.11-12 This view was supported by Komninos, in The EU White Paper for damages actions: A first appraisal 
p.86.where he refers to the “procedural” matters being seen as candidates for harmonization through a Directive in 
the White paper 2008. Also see Nebbia in Damages actions for the infringement of EC competition law: 
compensation or deterrence? (2008) European Law Review 33, p.24 where she links the concept of private 
enforcement semantically with compliance to EU law while actions for damages merely represent a claim. 
103 Effective Judicial protection requirements stem mainly from TEU Art 19(1), and the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights Art 47. However The right also extends to defendants, and any favouring of the court to the 
claimant to perform the tasks of sanctions and deterrence maybe problematic from the point of the defendants. See 
Havu, (n.72) p.197. 
104 See also p.14, and (n. 85-86). 
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based on this interpretation will be covered in the later sections under the application of 
quantification methods.  
 
Secondly, in the case of irrecoverable damages due to impossibility of assigning or establishing 
an infringement or some cases of remote or minor damages, it may refer to abstention from 
damages awards to invest resources into the public enforcement mechanisms.105The latter case 
of effectiveness will be excluded for the purposes of  this study.106  
 
The original meaning and the purpose of the principle of effectiveness, as shortly mentioned at 
the beginning of this section is to prevent the exercise of EU law becoming “practically 
impossible or excessively difficult”.107  The leaving of the enforcement of EU law to national 
courts often produces ambiguous results and usually in ends a “Jack-in-the-box situation”108. 
The principle, when used categorically, may serve as a handy tool in reinforcing the remedial 
discretion of the EC and the NCAs’, and finding a balance between procedural autonomy and 
EU Competition Law remedies.109 The following categorical approach will be used to assess the 
effective use of the” principle of effectiveness” later on in this study. 
 
In ensuring the above-mentioned balance, the ECJ has been active in its interpretation of 
effectiveness principle in various cases. The principle was first discussed in Comet110 and REWE 
111cases and subsequently developed further by ECJ in various other cases. The characteristics 
of the used methods were identified by Norbert Reich under 3 main approaches.112 Firstly, it is 
the principle’s eliminatory function. Reich notes that together with the principle of equality, the 
 
105 Remote cases refer to for example „umbrella customers“, or difficult multi step assessments.See (n. 283). 
106The author is of the meaning that, for the purposes of this study, only litigated cases can bring insights. 
107 Manfredi , para 71. 
108 Thomas Wilhelmsson refers to a“ Jack-in-the-box” situation when the intertwinement of EC law and national 
legislation may create unforeseeability or ambuigity. See Juho Raitio, The Principle of Legal Certainty in EC Law 
(Springer 2003). P.75. 
109 Ioannis Lianos, The Principle of Effectiveness, Competition Law Remedies and the Limits of Adjudication. 
CLES Research Paper Series 6/2014. p.3. 
110 Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2043, paras 13–16. 
111 Case 33/76 REWE Central Finanz [1976] ECR 1989. 
112 Norbert Reich, “The Principle of Effectiveness,” General Principles of EU Civil Law (Intersentia 2013) p.91. 
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principle of effectiveness has a negative content, in that they are acting together or separately, 
to eliminate restrictions to an EU law. This, however, does not mean that they create remedies. 
Once the national rule has been identified to have a restrictive effect. The competent court must 
either disapply the national rule or interpret it in conformity with EU law. 113  
 
Secondly, Reich notes a hermeneutical approach. 114 The approach provides that competent 
court following the identification of the EU right in need of adequate protection, in a more 
positive context than the previous approach, develops or points out remedies. This method also 
ensures the long term protection of the right in question. In the earlier mentioned Manfredi case, 
Reich points out that with this method, the ECJ first identified the right in need of protection, 
that is, the right to claim damages from infringements of Art (81) of TEC, and moves on to 
address the scope of the procedure at the member state level, that is, the compensation should 
be calculated not only for actual loss but also for the loss of profit plus interest. 
 
Thirdly, a hybrid approach was contended which combines the first two approaches. According 
to Reich, as a general understanding, recognition of EU right should lead to sufficient procedural 
remedies development. In the absence of these remedies, the national law should be interpreted 
in the light of the EU granted right. This hybrid approach can be put in motion first by finding 
the appropriate national remedies in case of violations. Secondly, the remedy will be measured 
against the principles of effectiveness and equality, thirdly if the measure fails to protect the 
right in question, it needs to be upgraded to EU standards.115 
 
 In the Courage 116decision, the ECJ has put private enforcement of EU competition law and 
principle of effectiveness in the same context for the first time. Pointing at the Private 
enforcement, Court reasoned that if a right to claim damages for a violation of EU competition 
law was not facilitated, i.e. a loss cannot be compensated, it would jeopardise the “full 
effectiveness” of Art. 101 of TFEU. In the previously mentioned Manfredi117 case where the 
 
113 Ibid, p.92. 
114 Ibid. p.95. 
115 Ibid, p.97. 
116 Courage , para.27.  
117 Manfredi . para 63. 
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hermeneutical approach was applied, ECJ developed the Courage decision further for its 
procedural aspects in the context of more effective private enforcement of competition law. 
These included the causal relationship between the inflicted harm and the violation of EU 
competition law (causal link), the compensation to include actual loss (damnum emergens) and 
the loss of profits (lucrum cessans) plus legally accrued interest, and prevention of unjust 
enrichment of the victims of the violation. Although the effective application of EU competition 
law was not yet codified, de facto, a frame was drawn for the procedural aspects of the principle 
of effectiveness in actions for damages. This was a clear demonstration of the importance given 
to effective private enforcement of competition law in the eyes of the ECJ, thereby indicating it 
as an integral part of corrective justice. 
 
The principle of effectiveness is now codified in the damages directive under article 4 as a result 
of a long legislative process.118 Also noteworthy to mention that the above mentioned 
considerations, in combination with the more economic approach from the EC119 has led to the 
understanding of the whole concept of effectiveness and the application thereof cannot be 
complete without “effective quantification of damages”. This last aspect is naturally tied with 
the other economical expertise during the quantification process of damages.  
 
2.2.4. Right to full compensation  
The first and foremost guiding principle120 of the White paper preceding the damages directive, 
the right to compensation has evolved from a principle to an EU wide right.121 As an integral 
part of effective damages actions and therefore private enforcement’s corrective task, right to 
full compensation entitles the victims of infringements with compensation to reinstate the victim 
 
118 See section 2.2.3. 
119 There is a significant shift from mere regulatory law, to economic analysis of law in the EC’s approach toward 
EU Competition Law. This can be seen from the economic analysis, effects based analysis and with the introduction 
to merger control.See also Dunne (n 39) p.7.where she refers to EC document  „A proactive Competition Policy 
for a Competitive Europe, published 20 April 2004 (COM(2004) 293)”, p.7; also Guidelines on the application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty (OJ C101/97, 27.4.2004).For the purposes of this study economical analysis of 
quantification are excluded. 
120 White paper (2008). 
121 Damages Directive (2014), Article 3 
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into the position had the infringement not taken place.122The entitlement also extends to the  
indirect purchasers.123 In the eyes of the Commission this can be ensured by compensating the 
actual loss, the loss of profits, plus legally accrued interest124; principles that were first 
mentioned in the Manfredi case125.The possibility of  seeking “full compensation” was expressly 
mentioned in the Donau Chemie and  Hydrogen Peroxide.126 
 
Following first from Manfredi case, and second from the Damages directive, the right to full 
compensation related framework regarding what can be claimed under the right seems not 
specific enough. Both instruments fail to address the extent of the damage or the sufficient level 
of causality the practice of the right requires, to really contribute meaningfully in damages 
actions. To argue the right to full compensation, one should be able to convincingly map out the 
relevant legal damage and its direct causation.127 The relevant supplementary guidelines also 
fail to “supplement” in this sense by providing mere economic alternates of quantification.128  
 
The applicability of the “right” becomes questionable when the above mentioned create 
inefficiencies through the lack of generic procedural guidelines, or remedial differences at the 
national level. The ambiguity that occurs with another “Jack-in-the-box” situation is often 
present in this regard and it may lead to forum shopping in the remote cases.129 The technical 
aspects of the extent of full compensation, the possibility of overcompensation which is 
prohibited , or disgorgement effects the claim might produce on the infringer, does not make the 
process any easier.130 In this state of play, where enforcement of EU law being left to member 
states, the determination of what is full compensation is left to the discretion of the national 
 
122 Ibid, Article 3(2). 
123 Damages Directive (2014), Article 12.indirect purchasers are private entitites who purchase from the second 
level and beyond of the supply chain i.e. from the claimant. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Manfredi  para 63 
126 See Donau Chemie (n. 82) para. 24, and Hydrogen Peroxide Case C-352/13 Hydrogen Peroxide SA v Evonik 
Degussa GmbH and Others EU:C:2015:335, para 63.   
127Havu, (n.72) p.190. 
128 Passing-on practical guide, and the Practical guide on Quantification. See section 2.4. 
129 Some meber states maybe willing to accept jurisdiction even in remote cases. 
130 Damages Directive (2014), Article 3, Recital 13. 
 
 23 
 
courts. Consequently, the question a claimant seeks answer to shifts from “whether I have the 
right to compensation in full?” to “What portion of my loss can I prove in court?” The answer 
to that question will depend mostly on the willingness of the national courts to accept different 
methods applied in the case law of the ECJ. Broadly speaking, the rule of “placing the victim to 
the position had the infringement not occurred” seemingly will be the only guide for assessment, 
and it might be too optimistic to expect a “framework” to develop. Additionally, the issue of 
“legal accrued interest” remains open to determine the extent of full compensation despite the 
efforts of creative interpretations.131 
 
The two questions above also provoke another discussion into the necessity of the word “right”. 
Similar to Nebbia’s assertion that the semantical play ‘private enforcement’ brings with itself 
indicates a different mechanism of “compliance with rules” than the formulation of ‘actions for 
damages’ which is a mere claim.132 When a claimant is obliged to “comply”, there is a clear set 
of rules while a mere claim to the “right to full compensation” may not be drawn a framework 
to be assessed within.  
 
The right to damages and full compensation thereof, contrary to many different EU rights, can 
be relied upon from the moment of an occurred infringement. This nature is different from rights 
that are readily available such as fundamental rights. The more remedial nature of the right to 
full compensation adds further disparity to the ambiguity between national rules and EU rights 
regarding its status as a “right”. However, the remedial/measurable nature of the right based on 
evidence also renders the practice of the right possible.  
 
Van Boom contends that the damages resulting from a competition law infringement are pure 
economic losses.133 An economic loss can only be put back in place by utilizing remedies, and 
this reflects what is expected of this right very clearly. In this connection, categorizing the right 
 
131 Manfredi para 95. 
132 Nebbia (n. 102). 
133 Willem H. van Boom, The Law of Damages and Competition Law: Bien étonnés de se trouver ensemble?(2010) 
p.9. available at : http://ssrn.com/abstract=1784808 20.11.2019. 
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as remediable, i.e. compliable with, favours the semantical meaning of private enforcement over 
actions for damages. The Commission’s silence on the ambiguity between the definition of a 
right v. remedial right confirms the favouring of economic analysis of law above the traditional 
characteristics of substantive law. 134 135 
 
Another reasoning behind calling the right a “right to full compensation” could be to categorise 
it together with other EU law provisions that may not be considered anything else than “rights”. 
For example, categorizing the right to full compensation as a remedial right, might bring about 
the hopeless discussion of how other EU rights should be categorized. The practice of rights in 
the hands of the NCA’s seem to be in need of remedies and those rights would certainly not 
benefit from such discussion. In any case, the right to full compensation remains an issue of 
proving the legally provable damage and the causal link between the infringement and the 
damage. Albeit the claimed amount and the final award may indicate a significance on how 
effective the practice of the right to full compensation has been, due to the lack of specific 
meaning of the right itself, it will be assessed together with the establishment of harm and the 
causal link. 
 
2.2.5. Road to Quantification 
2.2.5.1.Who can or should claim damages? 
The nature of competition law infringements affects different levels of consumers in the society. 
The potential victims of infringements can be grouped in five different segments.: Direct 
purchasers from the infringer, the indirect purchasers who purchase from the victim; umbrella 
customers, that are buying the same product outside the cartel for the same-high price; customers 
who would have bought if the price was not so high, and the providers of the infringer, so called 
upstream providers.136  
 
 
134 See for further insights on economic analysis of law Footnote 73. 
135 Among those chracteristics of substantive law, a set of unified EU wide procedural rules, as well as similar 
outcomes of analysis can be mentioned. However for the relevance of this study further elaboration is deemed 
superflous. 
136 Impact report  p.78. 
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The harm can be extended in the larger supply chain from the indirect purchasers of the 
infringing party to the upstream suppliers, or from direct competitors to the umbrella customers 
who are not even aware they are harmed. 137Usually the damage is compensable, but “who’s 
and what’s” of the recovery process depends mostly on the goals of the competition policy138. 
As studied above, in EU the tasks assigned to private enforcement are not entirely clear. The 
envisaged system where private enforcement compliments the shortcomings of the public 
enforcement indirectly contributes to the deterrence task albeit by a limited scope, while the 
social justice system demands that damages are compensated in the light of the goal of “bringing 
competition closer to the citizens”.139The latter vision or task for private enforcement allows a 
wide array of affected parties to bring actions for damages.140 
 
The two main types of harm result from infringements can said to be the deadweight loss (dealt 
by deterrence task) and the harm sustained by private parties (dealt by corrective task).141 
Deadweight loss is harm done to the welfare directly, while the private compensation will be 
pure economic losses and does not necessarily create welfare loss. This, however, does not mean 
that private compensation has no social goal and a wrongdoing can easily be found in cases of 
intentional infliction of damages. 142143 In parallel, cases of private harm that is not claimed, a 
deadweight loss might occur, which would need another mechanism such as disgorgement of 
unjust enrichment to compensate the society’s detriment. 144Therefore, generically, all potential 
victims should be allowed to claim damages. 
 
The inclusive theory above also creates a confusion in the application. There seems to be an 
unclarity among the public enforcers pertaining the tasks of the private enforcement. The focus 
 
137 Upstream providers may also be harmed by downstream cartels through decrease in the sales price or supply 
quantity.See also section3.1.1.1. 
138 Needless to say, that it also stems from the European case law. 
139 Green paper (n.70). See also Jürgen Basedow, Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Kluwer 2007. 
p.165 
140 Lianos (n 86).It can be considered that a “fairness”principle is applied. 
141 Van den Bergh, et..al,(n.59) p.7 
142 Ibid. 
143 Willem H. Van Boom, Pure Economic Loss. A Comparative Perspective, Wien/New York: Springer, 2004, p21. 
144 Van den Bergh, et..al,(n.59) p.7 
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on the deterrence aspect of private enforcement rather than compensating pure economic loss 
whether it serves a social justice or not, produces insufficient clarity in addressing for example 
the sufficient extent of causal link or the compensation in full (restitution in integrum).145 This 
interpretation may also be backed by the silence for clear guidelines from commission regarding 
those issues.146Nonetheless, as a rule, all victims, except for bringing actions by means of a 
collective redress, are allowed to claim damages from competition infringements.147 The initial 
concerns related to a collective mechanism were centred around the fact that such action might 
‘privatise the production of  the public good’. 148 This viewpoint seems to be changing though 
as the EU parliament is momentarily negotiating the first ever community rules on collective 
redress mechanisms.149 
 
The wide acceptance of victims in court does not immediately entail the contribution to the 
restoring of the dead weight loss. For a successful claim, proof of the total harm inflicted and a 
direct causal link between the two is necessary. 150 This requirement eliminates a good number 
of purchasers whether direct or indirect who have paid more than necessary. Another worthy 
mention is the consumer segment who would have bought the goods had there been no 
infringement. Restoration of the dead weight loss caused to this segment would be impossible. 
On the other hand, the pure economic loss, which is given standing, is relatively easier to 
compensate with clear guidelines and practices. 
 
The more difficult and remote claims, such as those of umbrella consumers, where the 
attribution of the award is complex and many layered, means the system may not work 
efficiently. Referring to earlier analysis, in these cases reallocating sources to enhance the public 
enforcement may produce better results for competition goals.151The overall efficiency should 
 
145 See also Jurgita Malinauskaite, Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Lithuania: a Story of 
Underdevelopment, ThomsonReuters G.C.L.R., Issue 3 2013. p.133. 
146 See unclarities in cases Courage , para.27. Manfredi, para 60-64, Kone  ,21-26 . See also section 2.2.5. 
147 Courage ,para 24. to the procedural aspects clarified in Manfredi . paras 53-64. 
148 Van den Bergh, et.al, (n.59) p.5. 
149 See EP press release : https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190321IPR32135/new-rules-to-
help-consumers-join-forces-to-seek-compensation 24.03.2020. 
150 See sections 2.2.5.3. and 2.2.5.4.  
151 Havu (n.72) p.194. 
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accordingly contain elements of detection of infringement and the sufficient source for the 
claimant once the standing in court is given.152153 
The US system on the other hands applies the efficiency factor very often by denying the indirect 
purchaser standing.154 In the EU with the decision in Kone, the umbrella customers were 
categorically included in the list of claimants with the right to claim damages. However, the 
same issue was revisited in the Otis case and the emphasis was made that the connection should 
be direct.155 As a result, in theory, all victims of competition infringements may claim damages 
in court on the condition that the causal link is established with the damage.156 
 
A separate note should be made regarding abusive enforcement. While the public enforcers act 
in good faith, the same may not be said about private claimants.157 Unlike the frequency these 
actions take place in US, nevertheless, in EU the risk of potential abusive litigation is also 
present. In the absence of treble damages, some private entities may still claim damages and 
demand an injunction to halt a given business flow. The damages that may occur due to halting 
may not be compensable in full and may create a deadweight loss.  As a precaution some court 
escrow account maybe used to limit a potential loss or deny standing for this model cases in 
damages action. 
2.2.5.2.Definition of Harm 
The definitions of, harm, compensation, restitution and damages can be semantically different 
and interchangeable, but legally in different jurisdictions, they may indicate different legal 
consequences.158 Given the variety of jurisdictions in the EU, a common definition is difficult 
 
152 US system generally denies for instance, umbrella customers standing for efficiency purposes. See Van den 
Bergh, et.al, (n.59) p.8. Further insight  available in cases Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 392 U.S. 
481 (1968)  and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 431 US 720 (1977) , where in both cases the efficiency consideration 
denied indirect purchaser standing in the court. 
153 It may also be articulated that some courts with lack of experiences in actions for damages  , may use these 
efficiency arguments to deny cases, and create potential deadweight losses. See. Also Malinauskaite, (n. 145). 
154 Ibid U.S cases. Also see Firat Cengiz, Passing-On Defense and Indirect Purchaser Standing in Actions for 
Damages against the Violations of Competition Law: what can the EC learn from the US? CCP Working Paper 07-
21 p.19. 
155 Kone ,  Case C-199/11  Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and Others  EU:C:2012:684  ( Otis ) para 65.   
156 This is also the case to for the reasons of fairness. 
157 See Wils  (n.45),p.13. 
158 See  Green Paper  Recital 114. 
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to agree upon. In this impracticality, it may be easier to address what distinguishes damages in 
form from other well-established definitions that may not be considered as damages. 
 
The definition of harm in EU can be found among the lines of the following: the range/extent 
of the harm could stem from the principle as accepted in Damages Directive “placing the victim 
to the position had the infringement not occurred”159. However, in that it should be kept separate 
from disgorgement.160 Also, compensation may not lead to overcompensation whether by means 
of punitive, or multiple damages161 and, therefore, cannot be multiplied in amount. What may 
also be relevant is the function of damages. Reparative function of damages focuses on the 
losses of the claimant, while the preventive function is to exploit the task of deterrence, by 
preventing a tradeoff situation between the infringement and damages.162The former is of  the 
essence for the claimant while the latter for the public enforcers. 
 
2.2.5.3. Establishment of The Extent of Harm 
The theoretical upper limit of compensation drawn in the Manfredi163 case left out the very 
important aspect of the quantification process the “establishment of the extent of harm”. The 
right to Full compensation is a well-established right, however it can only be reached if the 
extent of the harm inflicted is estimated.164 The specification needed to determine the extent of 
the harm is found in notions set by the ECJ such as full compensation, adequate compensation 
and commensurate compensation during its earlier preliminary rulings.165 The terms are used 
interchangeably, combined or to distinguish, but in any case are largely contextual. The 
interactions of these notions do not automatically flow from the right to full compensation, 
hence they are separately studied. 
 
 
159 Damages Directive , Art 3(2). 
160 See (n 65). 
161 Damages Directive Recital 13. 
162 See (n 216). 
163 Manfredi para, 31. 
164 Damages Directive 2014. 
165 Katri Havu, Full, Adequate and Commensurate Compensation for Damegs under EU Law: A challenge for 
National Courts? European Law Review, precopyedited version. p.5. 
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The interchangeable use of the notions, much like the concept of effectiveness, seem to be the 
case of a semantic interpretation. In Paquay166 case the term adequate was used to underline the 
need to cover all damages when the financial compensation was found to be the suitable method 
to punish an infringement of community law.167 A similar meaning was noted to underline the 
commensurateness of the damages award with the sustained damage, while underlining 
effectiveness and deterrence effect of a damages award .168Both notions were noting the full 
compensation principle in the context they were used. 
 
In Marshall II 169case, adequateness of damages award was accepted to have equal meaning to 
full compensation. The court noted the fact that compensation may also be given by means other 
than financial, but in discriminatively dismissal cases a financial compensation needs to be 
made, and to be made in full to make the wrongdoing be “made good in full in accordance with 
the applicable national rules.”170It is also worthy to note that the court assigns the duties of 
deterrence and injunction on top of corrective measures to the upcoming private litigation.  The 
award of full compensation by means other than financial points out the possibility of non-
economic measures to reach to full compensation in the context of this ruling. In other words, 
the full effect of EU law should be reached not only by corrective measures but also by 
deterrence.171 
 
The combined use of the notions on the other hand is based on a very straightforward logic. The 
notions of adequateness and commensurateness can only be assessed if the upper limit of the 
damage, i.e. the legally relevant  damage accepted to be the full compensation, is determined.172 
 
166 Case C-460/06, Nadine Paquay v Société d’architectes Hoet + Minne SPRL. ECLI:EU:C: 2007:601. (Paquay) 
167 Ibid, para 46,51. 
168Ibid, para 49. 
169 Marshall II .. 
170 Ibid, para 26. 
171 In support of this note , the AG’s comment is noteworthy. AG Van Gerven the adequateness of the damage is 
in relation to the damage however does not necessarily mean to equal the total damage. Se Havu, (n, 72) p.16.See 
also Paquay para 45 for the reference to deterrence effect. 
172 Ibid, p.15. se also C-407/14 María Auxiliadora Arjona Camacho v Securitas Seguridad España, SA 
EU:C:2015:831.para 4. (Arjona Camacho). that court implies there is a direct correlation to extent of full 
compensation and adequateness. 
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The correlation however, may prove to be erroneous, if possible at all, given that full 
compensation is not always awarded by means of corrective justice, i.e. financial awards.173 
 
The distinctive function assigned to the notions become visible, when in each context the 
application of a notion automatically indicates an exclusion of other notions. For example, 
commensurate compensation may at times mean that loss of profit can be excluded in the 
calculations which is incompatible with EU law ever since the Manfredi decision. In such 
exclusion, a reversion can be seen to the combined use of the notions to determine the method 
in reaching full compensation. In Brasserie case, the ECJ has underlined to the directed question 
whether loss of profits should be included in the determining the extent of the damages, that 
commensurateness may not mean to exclude the loss of profits, and that the damages would 
only then be meaningfully awarded.174 Subsequently, this principle was upheld by the court in 
Palmisani, where the court combined the notions and noted that the effective protection of the 
rights necessitates “commensurate” reparation of the loss or the damage,175 and that the national 
court must ensure the “adequate” award for the damages. 176Nevertheless, distinctive nature of 
the notions can still be noticed for instance in contextual limitations where commensurateness 
may indicate lower limits of compensation, while notion of full compensation can have less 
limiting effect to comply with EU law.177 
 
The methods used other than financial compensation to reach full compensation are also 
indicative of the applicability of these notions in cases other than actions for damages.178 Similar 
to the concept of effectiveness, the creative or interchangeable use of these notions seems to be 
utilized by the ECJ to facilitate the full effect or effectiveness of EU law or the principle of 
 
173AG Van Gerven (n, 171). 
174 C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Federal Republic of Germany and The Queen v Secretary of 
State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and Others. ECLI:EU:C: 1996:79. Para 90. (Brasserie). 
175 C-261/95 Rosalba Palmisani and Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (INPS) EU:C: 1997:351 para, 26, 
(Palmisani), the court notes the inclusion of the loss of profits. 
176 Ibid, para 35. 
177 If the national court attempts to define commensurateness by excluding some aspects , the notion of ful 
compensation would enhance the scope to bring the definition in compliance with EU law. 
178 See Marshall II . Summary point 1.referring the different means available for discrimination cases. 
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judicial protection .179 In more specific contexts the notions may also facilitate damages actions 
by narrower definitions. For example in Hansson180 case the application of the Plant Variety 
Rights Regulation181 triggered ECJ to point out that Art 94 of the regulation reflected the 
principle of “objective and full compensation” and that the loss of profit was irrelevant given 
that compensation must be in full but on objective basis that it covers “solely the damage which 
claimant has sustained as a result of the infringement”.182 
 
Nevertheless, the vague application of the notions and the contextually differing definitions 
confuses the system and creates uncertainty. This vagueness combined with situations where 
balancing of rights must take place may create confusion even if a notion is narrowly interpreted. 
A further confusion can be said to exist is related to the tasks assigned to private enforcement. 
The ECJ’s efforts in combining corrective justice with other tasks of competition law creates 
ambiguity and confusion in actions for damages.  
 
Regardless of how good of an attempt is made by ECJ on various preliminary rulings, the use 
of the notions and the extent of the full compensation rests in the hands of the national courts. 
The varying procedural aspects, albeit tried in the best possible method of compliance with EU 
law, still makes the damages actions prone to produce different results jurisdictionally and the 
question of “what is legally relevant?” remains an open one.183 It is understandable that 
procedural autonomy can best address many aspects of full compensation principle such as the 
application of yardstick methods for quantification.184 Indeed, there is still the need for some 
level of legal certainty in this field for effective private enforcement.  
 
179 See section 2.2.3.See also Paquay para 45. 
180 C-481/14 - Jørn Hansson v Jungpflanzen Grünewald GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2016:419. (Hansson) 
181 Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights. 
182 Hansson , para 40. Court was comfortable to disgorge profits though at the amount that infringer unfairly gained. 
See para 29. See also Havu, (n, 72) p.12. 
183Norbert Reich, Horizontal Liability In Ec Law: Hybridization Of Remedies For Compensation In Case Of 
Breaches Of Ec Rights, Common Market Law Review 44: 705, 2007. Reich mentions and furthers the discussion 
on the unsuccesful litigations at the national level. 
184 See section 3.3. 
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2.2.5.4. Causal Link/Causality 
The law is in the continuous search of establishing connections between events to establish a 
pattern and to attribute responsibility in the case of wrongful decision.185 The basis for actions 
for damages is no different. The application of “conditio sine qua non” principle is essential to 
private enforcement and is the main principle behind the but-for comparator quantification 
methods.186 More particularly, in the EU the embodiment of causality requirement refers to an 
infringement of EU law while being immediate and exclusive and a cause for the attributable 
damages.187 
 
The diverse liability regimes in the EU just like other requirements of private enforcement, also 
troubles the causality requirement.188 The intricate nature of establishing the causal link was 
first acknowledged for private enforcement in the Ashurst report,189 followed by the Green paper 
which hinted the difficulties pertaining the practical and theoretical challenges arising out of the 
import of the concept of “economic causality” in a legal and factual setting190. Since then no 
clarification or harmonization efforts have been finalised other than the requirement of the 
application of the twin EU principles of effectiveness and equality.191 
 
This intricacy seems to centre around the notion of the acceptability of sufficient causal link. In 
other words, when court is attempting to implement the principle of full compensation, the 
degree or the extent of the acceptable causal link is left open to the national systems.192 
Similarly, which is a sufficient event to break the causal link is left entirely to the national courts. 
193The establishment of the relationship between two events has direct consequences to the 
 
185 Claudio Lombardi,Causation in Competition Law Damages Actions. Cambridge 2020.p.5 
186 See section 3.2. 
187 Havu, (n. 72) p. 191. 
188 Lombardi (n. 172) p.54. 
189 Ashurst Report  p.6. 
190 Lianos (n. 86), p.5, See also Green paper Question N. 
191 See Green paper Section 2.9. White paper section on damages where also the position of indirect purchasers are 
considered to be very difficult to prove the causal link given the remoteness to the infirngement. But the causality 
as a concept was not discussed seperately.See also Damages Directive Recital 11 for the twin principles. 
192 Havu, (n. 72) p. 192. 
193 Havu, (n, 165). p.22. Here can actions such as contributory negligence can be considered to break the link from 
the perspective of the applicable damages’ liability provisions. 
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reparation and may hinder compliance with EU law.194The road to the quantification is 
dependent on the causal link and there is no need to decide on the amount of compensation in 
its absence.195  
 
The task of corrective justice and therefore the compensation assigned to private enforcement, 
allows the wide interpretation of who should be allowed standing in court.196This inclusive 
approach however, produces different applications, especially in those member states that depart 
from the general rule of liability and leave the setting of upper limits to the courts.197 In parallel, 
some courts may exclude essential mitigating concepts such as duty of care or contributory 
negligence.198 The same restrictive approach may also be used for establishing the causal link 
and may be at the discretion of the courts, meaning that “some categories of harmed individuals 
or firms may not be able to prove the harm suffered or the causation link” and lead to only direct 
purchasers to initiate actions for damages, thereby increasing the social harm while limiting the 
scope of corrective justice.199 
 
As a more general view, in the absence of clear rules, the determination of sufficiency of the 
causal link may be derived from the traditional legal causation and can pursue a more 
deterministic approach towards causation. 200This means the utilization of the “all or nothing” 
approach where it is assumed that a damage has occurred as a direct result of an action. But it 
has become evident in the past that this type of analysis is insufficient.201 To complement this 
shortcoming a stochastic approach was developed, where a victim only had to show that some 
 
194 That is, for instance exclusion of loss of profits where no causal link was successfully established. 
195 Havu, (n. 72) p. 198. See also Damages Directive Art.12-15. 
196 Lianos(n. 86), p.7. See also section 2.2.5.1. 
197 Ibid, p.7 footnote 26. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Andrea Renda, et.al. Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare impact and potential 
scenarios, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 21 December 2007, p.418. The report indicates the umbrella customers 
and Indirect purchasers have amounted to a very little portion of the total number of actions for damages. See also 
Lianos (n. 86), p 44. 
200 Hanns A. Abele, Georg E. Kodek & Guido K. Schaefer, Proving Causation In Private Antitrust Cases, Journal 
of Competition Law & Economics, 7(4), p.852 
201 Ibid, See also Lianos(n. 86), p.18. 
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damage was inflicted to some people as a result of an infringement202. To limit 
overcompensation an overall amount of damage is determined and attributed to different 
infringers in complex cases.203 
 
Another challenging aspect of the requirement may have semantic explanations. The notions of 
“causal link” and the “direct causal link” and their interrelations are not studied at the EU level 
and causes ambiguity. As an example, in Kone, the umbrella customers were categorically 
included in the list of claimants who were given standing to claim damages. Sometime later the 
ECJ added an ambiguity, noting in Otis that the connection should be direct.204 
 
A noteworthy difficulty is existent when the causal link may be too remote from the 
infringement. In the national systems it is usually expected that the damage or loss must be in a 
reasonable connection with, and not too remote from, the event that has established the liability.  
This is known as “reasonable attribution”. 205 However, subjects of cases where remote causality 
is present, both proving the causal link as well as defending can be problematic.  From the 
perspective of the defendants, the causal link requirement may be very hard to rebut as the 
presumption of cartels causing harm extends also to the establishment of the causal link in the 
case of passing-on defence. In other words, an indirect purchaser can by prima facie evidence 
show that the passing on is occurred once the direct purchaser has proof of an overcharge is paid 
by them.206  
 
From the perspective of the claimants, in causal uncertainty situations other than those where a 
direct attribution of the damage to specific infringement is possible, different or more collective 
methods can be utilized. For example in a situation where the liability of multiple infringers is 
established, a court can move to accept the causal link for the whole being established and 
 
202 Hanns A, et.al (n. 200). p..852 
203 See next paragraphs. 
204See (n.155).   
205 According to Dutch law, particularly the nature of the liability and of the damage caused are relevant in this 
respect. See the link for a summary actions for damages in Dutch Law: https://www.groenendijk.com/en/practice-
areas/all-practice-areas/damages/ 22.04.2020.  
206 Havu, (n. 72) p. 197. See also Damages Directive recital 41. 
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attribute damages, rather than establishing a separate causal link for each infringer.207  A similar 
method can be said to exist where the courts would utilize an “administrative solution” to bypass 
the causal uncertainty. This approach would use public sanctions systems such as taxes or fines 
and consequently repair the victims of the infringements.208Burden of proof shifting may also 
provide relief for the uncertainty and for fairness reasons.209 
 
2.2.5.5. Passing-on 
The potential for overcompensation is a real one and it poses equally damage to the markets and 
the society as a whole. In the pursuit of preventing overcompensation, emerges the same 
question as before, “who should be offered standing in court for damages?”.210 Following on 
from the relevant section  above,211 tied with the fairness principle,212 every individual should 
be entitled to claim suffered damages, and all the infringers must be allowed to invoke passing-
on defence against the downstream purchasers; and even upstream providers, who are claiming 
full compensation for their losses incurred through input price reduction .213 214 
 
The passing-on defense excludes a claim for damages where goods and services have been sold 
further down the supply chain by the claimant, thereby “passing-on” all or some of the losses 
incurred from its purchase from the infringing supplier. The defense, when invoked, follows the 
loss and seeks to compensate the injured party, at least in theory.215 However, it also creates 
complexity and dampens incentives to launch a claim, as direct purchasers may confront 
uncertainty regarding the damages when claimed.216Also if there is a lack of coordination 
between courts in different locations, the infringer may be punished too severely, causing 
 
207 Lianos(n. 86), p 19. 
208 Ibid, p.20. 
209 Ibidem. 
210Ariel Ezrachi, From Courage v Crehan to the White Paper, Mackenrodt, Abuse of Dominant Position New 
interpretation and New Enforcement Mechanisms, 2008, p. 126. See also Lianos (n. 135), p.7. 
211 See section 2.2.5.1. 
212 Firat Cengiz, Passing-On Defense and Indirect Purchaser Standing in Actions for Damages against the 
Violations of Competition Law: what can the EC learn from the US? 2007, p.8. 
213 See section 2.2.4. and 3.1.1.See also Damages Directive Art 12.2 and 12.3. 
214 Lianos(n. 86), p 43. 
215 Ezrachi, (n. 210) p.128 See also Section 3.1.1. 
216 Ibid. 
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overcompensation or creating loss, which may be in form of a deadweight loss, or loss that 
effects the general welfare.217 
 
Unlike the general case with the tasks assigned to private enforcement of competition law, the 
choice of the Commission on the passing-on defence seemingly opts for mere correctional form. 
In other words, barring the defence from standing would result in a sort of deterrent effect where 
the infringers would feel less free to violate the law, or to trade off the fines from the potential 
gains.218 If this policy choice were to be aligned with other elements of private enforcement,219 
the passing-on should not be given standing in court and, albeit limited, the practice of 
corrective/compensation task of the private enforcement would also realise the task of 
deterrence.220 Barring of the passing-on defence may simultaneously create some efficiencies, 
as it would hand the claims to those who are best equipped to initiate them.221 In this particular 
case of passing-on, the Commission’s different/reversed policy choice to the assigned tasks, 
creates additional complexity to actions for damages.222 
 
In accordance with the principle of effectiveness, the national legal systems utilize procedural 
presumptions to facilitate the additional “fairness complexity”.223 For example in Dutch Civil 
Code Article 193p and 193q considers the overcharge to have passed on where an infringement 
of competition law has taken place and led to an overcharge to the direct purchasers, and where 
an indirect purchaser has purchased goods or services that are object of the infringement, or 
goods that are derived from the objects of the infringement.224 Such presumptions allow both 
 
217 Josef Drexl Consumer Actions After the Adoption of The Eu Directive on Damage Claims For Competition 
Law Infringements, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper No. 15-10, 2015, p.12 
218 Willem H. van Boom, The Law of Damages and Competition Law: Bien étonnés de se trouver ensemble? 
Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam 2010. p.12 
219 See section 2.2.5. 
220 Cengiz (n. 212) p. 8. 
221 Conversely, allowing the passing-on defense when the proving of the overcharge becomes impossible for the 
harmed party, maybe unjustified as it would mean the infringer is unduly freed from the harm he caused. See: 
Alison Jones, Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford 2014, p. 1117. 
222 Van Boom, (n. 218). p.12 
223The provisions are based on the Damages Directive, Art 14. 
224 See the proposed Dutch legislative changes for a short overview in the context of the Damages Directive: Dutch 
official gazette (In Dutch):https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-34490-2.html .20.04.2020. 
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indirect and direct purchaser standings as well as passing-on defense so that the claimants at 
two different levels in the supply chain and the defendant  may receive compensation/relief at 
their corresponding losses and not at the expense of each other.225Similarly, the infringers should 
not be excessively punished to the extent that their contribution to the overall welfare starts to 
include counting losses.  
 
2.3.Elements for Effective Quantification of damages 
Having studied the compounds of the road to quantification above, the effectiveness of actions 
for damages can be measured under two main headings: by fulfilling the “tasks assigned to 
private enforcement of EU competition law”226 in the light of the doctrine above developed by 
the ECJ, and by ensuring the practice of right to full compensation by fulfilling specific 
procedural requirements set out by the ECJ, combined with the appropriate methods of 
quantification. Below the legislative tools will be reviewed before moving onto the empirical 
quantification methods and the examination of the recent national case law based on these two 
main headings.  
 
2.4.Tools on the road to Quantification 
The framework of the road to quantification of damages is facilitated by the binding Directive 
on Actions for Damages227. The Directive is assisted by two guidance papers on Communication 
on Quantifying Harm228 accompanied with the Staff Working Document229; and the Practical 
Guide on Passing-on of Overcharges230. Other EU law and relevant case-law from the ECJ and 
the twin principles of effectiveness and equality compliments the damages disputes231. 
 
225 Cengiz (n. 212) p. 8. 
226 See section 2.2.1. 
227 Damages Directive (2014). 
228 European Commission (2013/C 167/07) - Communication on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on 
breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.Accompanied with SWD 
(2013). (Guidance on Quantification).See section 2.4.2. 
229 White Paper (n.4). 
230Study on the Passing-on of Overcharges. Prepared for the European Commission, RBB Economics, 
Cuatrecasas,Goncalves Pereira, (2016). Guidance on Passing-on (2019).. 
231 See Havu (n, 72) p.189. Some relevancy found in ECJ case law in cases other than actions for damages indicates 
a wider scope of cases will be accepted during damages actions. 
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2.4.1. Directive on actions for damages  
The Damages Directive is transposed to national legislation of member states at the end of 
2016232. The complexity resulting from the interchangeable use of the tasks assigned to 
competition law for the purposes of earlier identified “fair effectiveness”233becomes apparent 
from the first Article of the Directive. In line with ECJ case-law, Article 1 mentions that the 
directive pursues two ultimate goals, a) right to full compensation for all victims, thereby 
indicating all the potentially harmed individuals down the supply chain (fairness principle) and, 
b) fostering of undistorted competition in the internal market. 234 Consequently, it moves on to 
establish the right to full compensation and the twin principles of effectiveness and equality.235 
 
The two goals of the directive are formulated as such that they complement each other. The 
fostering of the undistorted competition in the internal market will be realized or complemented, 
by means of every individual’s right to “private enforcement”. In other words, the deterrence 
task will also be assigned to Private enforcement of competition law even though the task can 
be served better by different methods.236 
 
An important principle to note is that while compensation being the main tool for reaching the 
directive goals, it may not lead to overcompensation. Article 3(3) prohibits the possibility of 
punitive and multiple damages, as well as Article 12 (2), which sets out the principle that 
‘compensation for actual loss at any level of the supply chain does not exceed the overcharge 
harm suffered at that level’.237The rule while contributing to overall welfare, may limit the 
extend of the deterrence task in the hands of private enforcement demands a sensitive balance 
from the national courts.238 
 
 
232 Directive was officially signed on the 27th of December 2014. 
233 See section 2.2.3. 
234 Damages Directive Art 1(1). 
235 Ibid Art 2-3. 
236 Drexl (n. 217), p.2-3.  
237Damages Directive Art.3,12. See also Ibid, p.12. 
238 This would be the case iif the plaintiffs are not incentivized by high amount of compensation. 
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According to the Directive, the needed balance can be stroke by utilizing the passing-on defense 
and giving indirect purchasers standing in actions for damages.239 The procedural difficulties 
for the claimant on the burden of proof were addressed by the Commission in the proposal by 
leaving the burden to the defendant.240 However, to prevent overcompensation, EU legislators 
have added the possibility of reasonable request for proof also to the defendants, to assess the 
overcharge passed-on from one indirect purchaser to the other.241The facilitation of burden of 
proof for a successful claim or defense seems relatively easy as compared to unharmonized or 
“unincluded” requirements in the Directive of “causal link” and “extent of harm” which are 
necessary and essential elements before reaching to the quantification phase of damages.242 
 
Nevertheless, some relief was included in the Directive when procedural simplicities were 
introduced with the rebuttable presumption of “Cartels cause harm”, and the presumption of the 
passing of the overcharge.243 244The causal link requirement may be bypassed when there is a 
cartel identified245, and clear situations where passing-on is deemed to have taken place can find 
ground in the national legislation only to easily apply and encourage damages actions.246 The 
plaintiffs may be more willing to make use of these simplified procedures to claim 
compensation; however, the wide variety of the national court’s application may still deter them 
from filing their cases.247 
 
While the tasks assigned to Private enforcement are mixed and contextual, the procedural 
aspects of effective application of the right to full compensation, was left to national courts. The 
 
239 Art 13.,See also section 2.2.5.1. 
240 Also the difficulties regarding burden of proof at the indirect purchaser levesl were acknowledged in the White 
paper (2008), damages section. 
241 Damages Directive (2014) Art.13. See also Drexl (n. 225)p.13. 
242 See section2.2.5.3. 
243 Damages Directive (2014) Art.17(2), and 14(2). 
244 However, what is understood under the presumption maybe different per member state such as procedural or 
substantive . See the example of Hungary for the former and Portugal for the latter : Barry J. Rodger, Miguel Sousa 
Ferro, Francisco Marcos, A Comparative View of The Implementation Of The Eu Antitrust Damages Directive In 
Sixteen Member States, Working Paper IE Law School AJ8-243-I, 2018 p. 21. 
245 See Kone , para.10. where even an umbrella customer could claim damages from a non-cartel member.  
246 For example, Dutch law adopted three situations in o domestic law and actively using it.See aslo (n. 212). 
247 Drexl (n. 217)p.20. 
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various applications of the Directive articles at the national level, joined with the requirements 
in reaching the full compensation (i.e. the procedural requirements of harm, causality) makes 
the fulfilment of assigned tasks undoubtedly difficult. It can be said that the Directive chooses 
to address only some of the standing issues and invokes the procedural autonomy principle too 
often.  The reluctance in defining clearer guidelines may be considered as a slow process of 
minimal harmonization of procedural and substantive aspects of private enforcement, and 
effectiveness principle seems to be the biggest concern in the eyes of the EU legislator.248 Even 
in such setting some harmonization of the procedural aspects could have benefited private 
enforcement more than principal formulations that were, otherwise, already apparent from the 
case law.  
 
2.4.2. Communication on Antitrust Harm and Practical Guide 
In relation with the principle of Effectiveness, the right to damages may not become extremely 
difficult or impossible to practice. It was this idea that triggered the Communication on Antitrust 
Harm and the accompanying practical guide.249 The communication is purely informative and 
sets forth the principles of application, definitions, and the preferred interplay between the 
national courts and EU law during the damages quantification.250 On the guidance paper, the 
quantification process is studied based on the examples of empirical methods, their strengths 
and weaknesses as well as based on practical examples to guide the national courts. These 
methods are studied in more detail in the later sections. 
 
 
248 Francisco Marcos, Professor of Law at IE Law School, available at: https://lawahead.ie.edu/a-more-favorable-
legal-regime-for-antitrust-damages-claims-in-the-future-implementation-of-the-eu-antitrust-damages-directive-
in-sixteen-member-states/ 01.05.2020. Alternatively it may be a no process at all and that the remedial solution 
will only be expected from national level and balance in time. See: Magnus Strand, The Passing-On Problem in 
Damages and Restitution under EU Law.Elgar 2017, p.262. 
249 Guidance on Quantification . 
250 Ibid, recital 12. The real use case may depend on the national application that, unlike the Damages Directive 
which covers national competition law when applied, these soft law instruments cover only Art.101 and 102 of 
TFEU, and in case of conflict it is up to the national court to decide whether the guidance have any impact to the 
court’s quantification , if at all. See ; Strand (n.250), p.275 footnote 67. 
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2.4.3. Study and Guidance on Passing-on of Overcharges 
The procedural uncertainties mentioned in above sections has also led to the study on Passing-
on of overcharges. The main motivation behind the study was to extend the similar support that 
was expected of the earlier practical guide on the damages quantification to the field of passing-
on calculations. The study thoroughly covers the economic aspects of the passing-on assessment 
and finalised with a checklist for judges.251 The critical issues as were identified above in 
sections related to causality and passing-on which stand central to the damages assessment, were 
however, not clarified in the study to allow interpretations of EU law while applying the national 
law.252 On 1 July 2019, the European Commission published the official guidelines for national 
courts, outlining how to estimate the passing on extent. The guidance includes an overview of 
the theory of passing-on, and techniques for assessing the extent of pass-on, as well as recent 
case law from member states. 253 
 
According to another view, the hard work dedicated by the Commission to produce the 
guidelines was related to its intentions of preventing any economic difficulty to be used as a 
shield by the infringers to avoid liability. However, this position is contrary to the intentions of 
the Damages Directive, where over-compensation is more of a concern than the distribution of 
liabilities to wrongdoer and thereby, reflecting that, public and private enforcement should 
complement one another; but at the same time, the deterrence task is put one step ahead of the 
corrective task, i.e. right to full-compensation, by preventing over-compensation.254 255 
2.4.4. National Legislation 
In the Damages Directive, national courts are equipped with the remedial discretion for the 
actions for damages. This means the national courts have a very large room for manoeuvring to 
comply with EU law, i.e. practice the principle of effectiveness. 256 Its noteworthy that a final 
 
251 See (n 228) Guidance on Passing-on (n. 2019) p.181. 
252 Havu (n.72), p.189 
253 Guidance on Passing-on (n. 2019). 
254 Preventing over-compensation would allow all the harmed individuals to claim damages, and contributes to the 
overall and prevents creating losses to teh overall welfare by punishing the infringer excessively. See, section 
2.2.5.5. 
255 For the viewpoint see: Pier Luigi Parcu , Giorgio Monti, Marco Botta, Private Enforcement of EU Competition 
Law: The Impact of the Damages Directive, Elgar, 2018. p.67-68. 
256 Havu (n. 72), p. 189. 
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decision taken by a NCA or an appellate court decision may not be refuted in front of a national 
court in a given actions for damages.257 If the decision is originating from another member state, 
the national court must consider the decision at least prima facie evidence alongside the new 
evidence to be submitted.258 
3. Types of damages and Effective application of Empirical Quantification Methods 
The limited deterrence task of private actions for damages also bring infringements into light 
where the Competition authorities either, do not choose to pursue, or do not have enough sources 
to investigate. However, starting from the earlier years of the private enforcement, only twenty 
five percent of EU level convictions were followed-on with actions for damages” 259 260. This is 
mainly due to the lack of clear guidelines regarding the substantive law which was not perfectly 
bettered with the new Damages Directive. The result was legal uncertainty and therefore under-
over compensated or abusive actions for damages. 261  
 
Another important aspect of the actions for damages is the actual quantification scene and while 
there are number of methods to quantify, it is still a very intricate process. The release of the 
Guidance for quantification and the Damages Directive had no significant quantification related 
improvements for the claimants. This section will make an attempt to demonstrate the possibility 
of emergence of damages, the group of victims that are likely to suffer harm, and the 
complexities surrounding the quantification of damages. The application of the methods will be 
studied with references from case law from both United States of America and EU and the policy 
choices regarding the tasks assigned to private enforcement will be scrutinized. 
 
 
257 Damages Directive (2014) Art 9 (1). 
258 Ibid, 9(2). 
259 Follow-on: referring to an action for damages following an established infringement by a court or a National 
Competition Authority. 
260 European Commission Press release – 17.04.2014. 
261 Abusive action: referring to an action where the claim is either unmeritorious, or intentionally started damages 
action to prevent business of a competitor. 
 
 43 
 
3.1. Types of Damages 
The EU Competition law provisions centre around two main types of infringements that produce 
damages: Agreements with the object of restriction competition, and Abuse of Dominant 
Position. 262 When an undertaking engaging in anticompetitive conduct the restrictions caused 
in the market can vary from welfare losses to limitations of output. The primary goal of the 
infringers is to soften the competition.263  
 
3.1.1. Cartel Damage Situations 
Cartels are formed when companies collectively come to an agreement to fix market prices and 
maximize their profitability. Some examples of cartel formations can be market sharing 
agreements, where undertakings agree to allocate a geographic market to a given competitor 
that becomes a monopolist264; bid-rigging cartels where undertakings agree on a higher price to 
offer on a given procurement and thereby causing harm; or for instance forming a cartel 
basically to restrict the output in the market. Restricting the output in the market produces a 
corresponding increase in price and typically shows similarities with price-fixing cartels.265 
Damages caused by cartels can be extensive depending on the abovementioned scenarios. The 
magnitude of the price increase, the reduction in the output, and the duration of cartelization are 
essential elements in determining the extent of the damage. In most of these instances, the result 
is higher prices paid by direct purchasers or consumers down the supply chain and lower 
quantities than a situation absent the cartel.266 
  
In a cartelized world, economists are usually concerned with two types of adverse effects: 
welfare losses and transfer of so-called “economic rent”.267268 Welfare losses occur when parties 
to a cartel increase the price on a given good and profit the same amount by producing less of 
 
262 Artilces 101 and102 of TFEU. 
263 Ashton(n 3) p. 403. 
264 Oxera, Asimmakis Komninos, et.al. Quantifying antitrust damages Towards non-binding guidance for 
courts.(Oxera report)(2009) p.15. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Ashton(n 3) p.404. 
267 “Economic rent” can be attributed to an additional amount earned than what is economically necessary. 
268Ashton(n 3) p.406. 
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the same good. This quantity effect is the primary concern for competition law and may reduce 
choice and quality.269270 The latter effect occurs when the transfer of an excess price amount to 
undertakings forming the cartel. This “overcharge” does not have a significance in the efficiency 
calculations but should be considered as damage to the consumer.271Both of these adverse 
effects are typically present in a cartel situation; however, proving the quantity effect may be 
more difficult in a real-world scenario as its more straightforward to prove the goods that were 
bought at an increased price than those would have been bought had the cartel not existed.272The 
total amount of damages are considered to be the sum of both inefficiencies.273 
 
Further damages caused by the cartels can be related to production-related inefficiencies. A 
cartel situation may hinder the involved undertakings to search for a more cost or technology 
efficient solution and thereby allow other non-efficient competitors to stay in the market. The 
reduced incentive can extend to innovative capabilities and reduce the R&D investments of an 
undertaking274 and lead to barriers for entry in cartel covered market as the cartel would be 
incentivized to stabilize the cartel. These types of inefficiencies my subside for long periods of 
time.275 
The average cartel caused damages are preferred to be calculated based on the percentages. This 
allows the purchaser to calculate its damages easier by applying the relevant percentage to the 
total amount they paid.276 The amount of the average percentage of damage was found to be 
around 20% of the actual price, in a study conducted in 2008. 277 
 
269 The same effect is often named in the economic literature as Deadweight loss. 
270Ashton (n 3) p. 406. 
271Ibid. 
272Ibidem.  
273Ibidem. 
274Although one might argue that higher profits can lead to an increased incentive to invest in R&D 
activities.This was however argued against by Andrea Guenster, Do cartels undermine economic efficiency? 35th 
DRUID Celebration Conference 2013 Available at: 
https://conference.druid.dk/acc_papers/r562i7l5lf7hp9rv11dnahc0spep.pdf 01.06.2019. 
275 Ashton(n 3) p.410 
276 Oxera, p.14. 
277 John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartel Overcharges and Optimal Cartel Fines, in 3 Issues In Competition 
Law And Policy 2203 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008) p.2211. 
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3.1.2. Who is affected by cartel damages? 
Cartel damages impact both the vertical and horizontal relationships of the cartelized 
undertaking. At the horizontal level firstly the producers in the same goods market, regardless 
of the fact of being cartelized are affected from the damages.278In other words, any direct 
competitor with the possibility to enter into the cartel can be affected. Secondly, producers 
whose goods can be substituted to the higher-priced good can be affected. This may not sound 
logical as the substituted goods are usually cheaper in nature, but some producers choose to 
apply “cellaphane fallacy” that is, to offer the product with some cheaper versions, only to 
charge more for another version of the product.279As a result of the cartel, the buyers will only 
opt for the cheaper product causing damage to this producer. 
In the vertical relationships of cartels, any undertaking providing goods directly or indirectly to 
the cartelized undertakings as well as any direct or indirect purchasers from the cartel are 
potentially effected by cartel damages.280 In the case of providing goods directly, the 
undertakings may need to agree on lower sale prices of their goods as there would not be any 
other buyer in the market than the cartelized undertakings. Also, the demand for cartelized 
products will reduce and will result in lower quantities of input for direct providers. Both 
situations can be classified as loss of profits. Indirect providers, on the other hand, will be 
passed-on the level of price or quantity reduction by the direct providers of cartelized 
undertakings. The damages direct or indirect providers suffer are called upstream effects.281 
 
Furthermore, as a part of the upstream effects, the direct providers whose input to the cartelized 
undertakings has become lower, tend to supply their goods to undertakings that produce 
substitute goods to the goods supplied by the cartelists. 282 This type of umbrella effect 283 causes 
damage to the direct providers of the substitute goods producer and to indirect providers in their 
supply stream. 
 
278 Ashton (n 3) p.412 
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibidem. 
281 Ibid. p 413. 
282 Substitute goods are interchangable. If the price rises in one product the demand rises in the other. Oxford 
dictionary of Economics. p.451. 
283 Ashton (n 3) p.414. Umbrella effect refers to subtitute producers price increase as a result of pricing umbrella 
opened by the cartel.The umbrella allows for higher prices, However, in this case there is a reduction in price, as 
they can receive good cheaper from the direct providers of cartel. due to the cartel.. 
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In the case of purchasing directly from the cartel, the direct purchasers suffer damages by the 
price increase. To the extent these purchasers pass-on the higher prices to their 
customers/purchasers (indirect purchasers of the cartel), they might be reducing or increasing 
the cartel effect. Usually, higher prices applied to their goods indicate a quantity restriction and 
therefore, damages. The same situation is also valid for the indirect purchasers of the cartel, as 
they have to pay higher prices to buy from direct purchasers of the cartel.284These damages the 
direct or indirect providers suffer are called downstream effects.285 Similarly to the situation in 
upstream effects, the substitute goods to the cartelized goods produced by undertakings outside 
the cartel, become attractive due to their lower price. The non-cartelized undertakings can take 
this opportunity and raise their prices which in return will damage their direct and indirect 
purchasers along their supply chain by charging high prices and reducing quantity.286 
 
Other damaged groups of undertakings are those who produce complementary products to the 
cartelized product market. These can be batteries to torch market or cartridges to the printer 
market. These products are only sold to complement other products and will also be severely 
damaged from a quantity reduction cartel produces.287 
 
While the abovementioned groups are the most clearly effected parties and tend to take action 
the most in courts288, the general equilibrium theory tells us that cartels can influence the whole 
economy by changing the prices and causing substitutes, similar to a stone thrown into a pond 
and causing waves to the entire pond.289290 
 
284 Ibid, p.415. 
285 Ibid. 
286 Ibidem. 
287 Ibid, p. 417. 
288Oxera,  p.15. 
289Ibid, p.413 
290 General Equillibrium Theory considers all markets simultaneously and no change in any market should benefit 
any party. Oxford (n 282), p.196. 
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3.1.3. Abuse of dominant position damage situations 
The abusive conduct related damages can take two forms: exclusionary and exploitative 
damages.291 
Exclusionary damages result from excluding an existing or potential competitor of a dominant 
undertaking from exercising its freedom to compete in a given market. The excluded 
undertakings are usually prevented entry or forced to exit the market altogether.292 The damage 
can extend from the profit loss of the excluded undertaking to the end-consumers, if the conduct 
in question causes a reduction in the competition which leads to higher prices, a reduction in 
choice, or a reduction in quality.293  These type of damages can result from various abusive 
conducts such as predatory pricing, tying and bundling, refusal to supply and margin squeeze.294 
Unlike the cartel damages, exclusionary abuse damages may subside over time. The abuse is 
likely to last only until a potential competitor is forced to exit the market after which the 
conditions may return to normal for end consumers.295 
 
Exploitative conduct related damages usually arise as a result of excessive pricing. Similar to 
cartel damages, excessive pricing causes utility and profit losses due to high prices. The pricing 
strategy, however, may also include predation, in which case the prices initially will drop, and 
the damage from high prices will occur until after a specific predation goal is realized.296   
 
3.1.4. Who is affected by Abuse of Dominant position damages? 
In the case of exclusionary conduct, the damages are borne mostly by the direct competitors to 
the dominant undertaking. Practices such as predatory pricing or rebate schemes may have a 
direct bearing on competitors’ revenue and may cause them to exit the market297. Their exit or 
loss of revenue will cause the suppliers of the excluded competitor a loss of profits due to the 
 
291 TFEU Art.102. 
292 Oxera, p.17. 
293 Oxera, p.17. 
294 See Section 2.2. These types of abuses are the enforcement priorities of Art 102 on the European Comission’s 
guidance paper. See: OJ C 45, 24.2.2009 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 
82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings . 
295 Ashton (n 3) p.426. 
296 Ibid. 
297 Ibidem. 
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reduced quantity of products sold.298 Potential competitors that are denied entry to the market 
due to barriers by the dominant undertaking are suffering potential profits as damages as well.299 
 
The similarities of damages between the cartel and exploitative conduct damages also extend to 
the actors that are likely to be damaged from this type of abuses. By analogy to cartel damages, 
the direct and indirect purchasers, the direct and indirect providers of goods to the cartel are the 
first to be recognised to suffer damages.300 The providers of complementary goods and the direct 
and indirect purchasers of undertakings that supply substitute goods to the goods produced by 
the cartel are also among the parties to suffer damages.301 
 
3.2. Empirical Methods of Quantification of Damages  
The methods of quantification form another very important component of the actions for 
damages. Its importance was showcased in the Courage and Crehan302 case, where the ECJ 
confirmed the distinct right to claim compensation for suffered damages and tasked the national 
court with calculation and assessing the extent of the damages. After the return of the 
proceedings to England, the High court noted that the issues relating to damages calculations 
were not argued before the House of Lords, and consequently did not arise for decision.303In 
other words, in the absence of the of the methods for quantification, the case was inconclusive. 
The quantification of damages of a specific claim may commence after the competition law 
infringement is detected, the causal link between the infringement and the damages sustained is 
established, and the attributions of the damages to the victims are identified.304 The primary 
method in the quantification of damages is to compare the existing infringement situation to a 
hypothetical counterfactual world that prevailed in the absence of an infringement.305A 
comparison between the but-for world provides the details on the economic activity and allows 
 
298 Ibidem. 
299 Ibidem. 
300 Ibid. p.427. 
301 Ibid. 
302 Courage and Crehan . 
303 Ashton (n3) p.428.Following the European judgment the case was proceeded in High Court, Court of Appeals 
and House of Lords in England. 
304 See also section 3.1.3.3. 
305 Ashton (n3) p.428. 
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estimation of damage based on the scenario but-for the infringement306. Frank Maier-Rigaud 
and Ulrich Schwalbe claim that regardless of the nature of the infringement, the methods applied 
for quantification of competition law damages are always based on but-for comparator models, 
as the only difference is whether the comparator is theoretically constructed or taken from an 
existing market.307 This may also mean that these comparison can be done best in the hands of 
the national courts. The methods reviewed here are categorized in line with the type of damages 
covered in the earlier section which in turn was based on the numerical order of the main 
competition articles in TFEU.  Although several potentially applicable methods may be 
available in each case, the “correct” method may be open under EU law. 
 
3.2.1. Quantification of Cartel Damages 
In creating a counterfactual scenario that is comparable to the cartelized market some elements 
such as but not limited to, time, geographical coverage and prices can be used.308 In a situation 
where none of these elements is reliable or available, an artificial market situation may be 
created based on industrial organisation theory.309Consequently, the relevant empirical method 
for quantification may commence.  
 
3.2.1.1. Time comparator approach 
The time comparison approach is meant to be applied to the same market but in different time 
periods. The two different timeframes are before and after the cartel periods.310 It is usually 
easier to identify the price difference as the conditions in the counterfactual and the real world 
remains the same.311 The main indicator is the average prices before and after the infringement. 
 
306 Theon Van Dijk & Frank Verboven, Quantification Of Damages, In 3 Issues In Competition Law And Policy 
2331 (ABA Section Of Antitrust Law 2008), p.2332. 
307 Ashton (n 3) p.428. 
308 Staff Working Document (2013) p.15. 
309 Ibid. Industrial organization refers to a field of economics dealing with the behaviors of undertakings and 
regulatory policy choices. 
310 Staff Working Document (2013) p.46. 
311 Ashton (n 6) p.431. 
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However, if it is not possible to determine a cartel-free period prior or after the cartel, an 
alternative “during-and after” approach may also be used312.  
While the application of this approach is rather simple, in practice it does not hold well313. The 
main difficulties are regarding the determination of the exact cartel period.314 For example, the 
cartel may have raised the prices very slowly, or the data regarding the cartel commencement 
may be erroneous315. Similarly, if only the average before and after price levels are used the 
outcome may be erroneous in a price war situation. Such situations usually indicate a post-cartel 
moment, but may also occur during the cartelization as the involved undertakings may not be 
able to distinguish low demand periods caused by their own business cycles.316 Conversely, if a 
cartel end date was marked during an increase in imports of products, the price drop does not 
necessarily indicate the end of the cartel.317 Although, as a model, the before and after situations 
are identical in market conditions, other variables regarding cost and demand, such as prices of 
substitute goods, input costs and the application of Lerner index318 are involved alongside the 
statistical data in used.319For example, by using regression analysis, which studies the 
relationships between variables, it becomes possible to understand the formation of the price 
but-for the cartel and is very helpful in determining the overcharge. This method is called the 
forecasting approach. 320 
 
Furthermore, the prices after the cartel episode can be deceptive.321 Firstly, the cartelists that are 
expecting actions for damages may keep their prices high after the cartel to demonstrate less 
amount of profit losses which can lead to lower damage claims.322Secondly, after a cartel 
 
312 Hans W. Friederiszick, Lars H. Röller – Damages actions for Antitrust Infringements (ESMT Working Paper, 
2010). P.11. 
313 Ashton (n 3) p.431. 
314 Hans W.Friederiszick, (n312) 
315 Ashton (n 6) p.431. 
316 Hans W.Friederiszick, (n 312) p.21. 
317 T.van Dijk, F.Verboven, Quantification of Damages, 2005, p.9. 
318 G. Monti, EC Competition Law , Cambridge 2007, p.87. Variables refer to a quantity that is liable to change. It 
may be quantities of goods or sale prices. See Oxford Dictionary of Economics Oxford, 1997. 
319 T.van Dijk(n 317), p.9. 
320 Ashton (n 3) p.433. 
321 Ibid.434. 
322 Ibid. 
 
 51 
 
episode, the reduction in the prices can be drastically low, not reflecting market realities. Both 
situations may necessitate focusing only to before cartel periods for calculating overcharge. 
 
Lastly, when a bundle of products are used as variables, it can be deceptive if they’re not 
appropriately analysed.323The average prices before or after cartel may change, simply because 
the relative quantities that form the products or the bundles may have changed and 
correspondingly their sale shares may have dropped out of proportion. This situation may impair 
the determined average prices or hide cartel effects. 324 
 
3.3. Yardstick Method 
As the name speaks for itself, the method uses a “yardstick” to reach out to a similar cartel free 
market with comparable market characteristics to apply before-after model. Cartel-free market 
can be within the same country, sector and/or markets with similar market structures. It would 
even be possible to use a generalized framework where many other cost and demand variables 
are involved in the assessment325.This would be favourable, as real life scenarios can be better 
reflected to the assessment and the market conditions can be better assessed. This however 
would often come at a significant cost as determining the variables in different countries as it 
requires more effort and time. The variables should be once again motivated or based on sound 
economic principles for the reasons explained in the previous section. 
 
In both the U.S. and EU applications of yardstick method, a higher rate of attention is paid to 
the “similar market” as it may not be in anyway affected by the Cartel agreement and the 
umbrella effects. In internal markets where the aim is to unify the market and different sectors 
under one, this may become a challenging task especially in cases where multi-national 
companies are involved which act through their subsidiaries throughout the internal market. 
However, where the comparable markets are clearly defined and not affected from umbrella 
effects, the quantification of the damages is easier. In the U.S supreme court case Zenith Radio 
 
323 Ibid.436. 
324 Ibidem. 
325 T.van Dijk, F.Verboven, (n 317), p.10. 
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Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.326 where Zenith filed for damages on the alleged exclusion of 
its imports to Canada; the Court allowed the economic experts of the Zenith to calculate the but-
for analysis based on the Zenith share in US and quantified the damages at 16% rather than the 
3% during the infringement that wold have been the case in the absence of the infringement. 
 
3.4. Cost Based method 
This method takes as reference the normal market conditions and strives to find the normal 
functioning market costs. The costs of the affected product under the normal conditions is added 
by a reasonable profit margin and the result would help understand the existence of a cartel 
situation. This application of but-for analysis is often called “bottom-up” approach.327 
On the other hand, the real-life cost analysis, input costs, or the costs based only on accountancy, 
do not reflect the real-life scenarios and may be prone to deliver erroneous results. The 
determination of the profit margin is not a practical or easy task, as the normal margin only 
becomes available if one first applies empirical methods to come to normal market conditions 
followed up by product and company specific margins328. However, the Commission’s position 
on this is slightly different, as it suggests in the German Paper Cartel Case329, where the court 
held a margin derived from a similar undertaking in a comparable geographic market not 
affected by the infringement which indicated profit margin. 
Furthermore, as pointed out in the Commission’s practical guidelines330, different types of 
production costs may be applicable to different types of sectors. This may require different set 
of rules to become applicable, as otherwise the calculations could be rather straight forward, and 
may only be applicable for a sector where only one type of product is produced. 
 
 
326 U.S Supreme Court Decision - 395 U.S. 100, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., (1969). 
327 H.Friederiszick, L, Röller – Damages actions for Antitrust Infringements ESMT Working Paper, 2010. P.12. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Federal Court of Justice Germany No KBR 12/07 referring to the profit margins generated in ‘comparable 
industries’ 
330 Guidance on Quantification, ,Recitals 108 and 109. 
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3.5. Simulation Method 
This method is quite closely related with cost-based method as it requires to some extend same 
information. The market based approach – as the Commission’s guideline refers to it-  aims to 
simulate the profit margin by applying different variables and market situations such as demand 
and cost elasticity..331 The simulation creates an artificial market where it can carry out 
counterfeited situations and find answers to but-for analysis. Recently the Asphalt Cartel case 
in Finland, which is the largest private competition law claim made by use of simulation method, 
where the court analysed the relationship between the variables and decided on the overcharge 
being %15.332  
The simulation has proved to be very helpful by making economic assumptions which decisions 
are based upon transparent, 333it helps court to process information within a reasonable time 
frame transparently and therefore allow courts to apply higher legal standards. This 
characteristic has widened its application also on merger analyses334. Additionally, combination 
of simulation and cost-based models is regarded more favourable rather than substituting each 
other, as the cost-based margin could than focus only on the competitive margins335 and may 
not need the application of other empirical methods to find the normal market situations. An 
example was found in the Netherlands where Dutch jurisprudence prescribes a similar abstract 
damage calculation in which the calculation abstracts from some circumstances . For example, 
property damage is calculated in an abstract manner and based on the objective repair costs, 
with or without any actual repair of the property or material.336 337 
 
331 Cost elasticity refers to proportional ratio changes between the variables; in this case the costs.See also Oxford 
Economis Dictionary (n  282). 
332 Finnish District Court - 09/10623, OCL 127 (FI 2013) Municipality of Helsinki v Lemminkäinen Oyi and VLT 
Trading Oy 
333 T.van Dijk, F.Verboven, Quantification of Damages, 2005, p.13. 
334 Ibidem.  
335 Ibid, p.12. 
336 See for the commentary Groenendijk  Kloppenburg Advocaten. Available at : 
https://www.groenendijk.com/en/practice-areas/all-practice-areas/damages/ 22.04.2020. 
337 See (n 364)  Stichting Cartel Compensation v Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. et.al case where the 
abstract calculation was first utilized. 
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3.6. Passing-on Quantification 
Similar to Simulation and Cost-based quantification, pass-on quantification’s two empirical 
methods also involve analysis based on input and price related calculations, and a model of the 
market where the plaintiff is active. The latter sheds light on the structural determinants of the 
anti-competitive behaviour and is similar in that aspect to the simulation method338. 
In the first method of cost-based approach the prices of the plaintiff are used as its input costs 
and the variables such as the supply and demand as factors that contribute to shape the final 
price. The margin it returns will be used to determine the pass-on rate.339 The rate is then used 
by the courts to calculate the discount issuable to the invoker of the passing-on defence. 
The second method creates a full competitive market and makes predictions on the anti-
competitive behaviour as well as on the degree of discount for passing-on.340 During the creation 
of the market, the price elasticity and information on competitors are of great structural 
importance341. If the behaviour of the competitors can be included, the method is likely to be 
more effective as it is a complete economic mode342 
 
Nevertheless, in both methods, due attention must be given to the market specific conditions. In 
the Christie’s and Sotheby’s price fixing case343, where both auctioneers were followed for 
fixing the buyer’s premiums and seller’s commission rates have agreed to settle for 256 mln. 
US dollars each. In the case the court has neglected the specific conditions of auction preferred 
by both parties and wrongly estimated the compensation payable to the buyers, which should 
have been lower than the sellers as their higher premiums were already factored in the price they 
paid. Market specific conditions must therefore be addressed by an expert in that market. 
 
3.7. Mitigating factors 
As a general principle, in but-for scenarios the victim should not receive more than the 
calculated harm as overcompensation is not allowed in the EU. This principle is rather easy to 
 
338 T.van Dijk, F.Verboven, (n 306) p.17. 
339 Ibid , p.18. 
340 Ibidem. 
341 Ibidem. 
342 Ibidem 
343 Ibid, p.21.  
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implement by comparing but-for the damages action. However, if the victim has also benefitted 
from this event in different ways, this amount may be subtracted reasonably from the 
compensation. For example, in non-competition case, if a car accident causes a victim to get 
badly injured but at the same time victim makes millions from publishing his/her story and 
struggle, the additional profits may be deducted from her compensation. This is called “off-
setting benefits”.344 Similar implementations may also be applied in actions for damages, 
however, due to the intricate and sensitive nature of the situations the application may differ 
significantly per case. Similarly, when some of the wrongdoing may be attributable to the 
victim, the compensated amount can be proportionally reduced. This principle is known as 
“Own fault of the injured person”. 345 
4. Practical Insights 
4.1.The Netherlands  
 
Alstom c.s v. TenneT c.s 
In the follow-on Cartel case, Alstom c.s v. TenneT346 c.s, Court of Appeal of Arnhem 
Leeuwaarden in the Netherlands heard the appeal in the earlier Gas Insulated Switchgear (GIS) 
case in which Alstom c.s. was found liable for damages in the amount of 14.1 million Eur for 
operating in a GIS cartel. Following the decision from the EC in 2008347 Tennet successfully 
claimed the overcharge they had paid throughout the years. During the appeal hearing, Alstom 
unsuccessfully raised issues such as the lex loci delicti, limitation periods and claimed that the 
district court who ruled at the first stage wrongfully included the project in cartel coverage that 
is topic to this case.  
Full Compensation 
During the district court hearings TenneT has claimed and was awarded all 14.1 million Euros 
i.e. received full compensation as claimed. In substantiating their claim, the court held that the 
burden of proof for such claim laid with TenneT. Tennet in return provided a quotation and a 
 
344 Ariel Porat, Eric A. Posner, Offsetting Benefits Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100: 1165. 2014, P.1166. 
345 See Groenendijk & Kloppenburg (n 336). 
346 ECLI:NL:GHARL:2018:7753 Alstom c.s v. TenneT Appeal case (Translations were made by the author of this 
study) 
347 Case COMP/F/38.899 – Gas Insulated Switchgear 
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contract showing a large price difference for the same product from another member of the cartel 
ABB Ltd, who received immunity from the EC due to the leniency procedure they initiated. The 
quotation date was during the cartel in 1999 and the contract was after the end of the cartel in 
2005. The court held that the burden of proof laid with Alstom to prove that the quotation and 
contract concerned a different product, and applied the principle of effectiveness, by giving 
Alstom the possibility to rebut the nature of the product. However, the court found that Alstom’s 
rebuttal was not sufficient. In a second attempt, Alstom argued that the drop in the prices was 
connected to the drop-in production costs, while not providing calculations to substantiate their 
argument. Conversely, Tennet has managed to prove that the production costs have become 
higher in the mean period.348 The court accepted Tennet’s calculations that led to the claim.  
Methods of Quantification /Passing On 
Tennet’s economists have calculated the cartel overcharge by applying time comparator 
approach model based on the alternative but comparable product. The cartel overcharge was 
estimated to be around %53 to %64349 by comparing the cost of the product during and after the 
cartel, including all variable circumstances such as currency rate and production cost raises. The 
percentage of the overcharge was applied to the original payment, which indicated the total 
overcharge to be between 13.000.000 to 15.200.000 Euros. The court awarded the average of 
the range as damages 14.100.000 Eur, plus accrued legal interest. 350 Subsequently, Alstom has 
invoked the passing-on defence. Based on the Dutch civil code which is in line with damages 
directive, the court was asked to deduct the passing-on charges. 
Tasks Assigned to Private enforcement / Overcompensation 
 In a striking argument, the court confirmed that Tennet was overcompensated; however, the 
chances of direct purchasers of Tennet recovering passed-on damages from Alstom were next 
to nothing given the limitation periods and procedural hinders; but overcompensating Tennet 
can lead to drop in their prices which in return still benefit the society and victims as such.351 In 
an exemplary decision of corrective compensatory justice, the court has taken away from the 
 
348 ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2014:6118. Rechtbank Gelderland, Alstom c.s v. TenneT District courts case  Para 2.18. 
349 See footnote 80. 
350 Alstom c.s v. TenneT  (n 145)  Para 4.33. 
351 Ibid, Paras, 2.29-2.31. 
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violator and created a scheme of full compensation for the victims who are not likely to claim 
their overcharge on their own, and meanwhile fully compensated Tennet.  
 
Van Gelder Groep B.V v. Shell Nederland Verkoopmaatschappij B.V. et.al. 
In an ongoing follow-on case from the Bitumen cartel decision of the Commission,352 Van 
Gelder Groep a road construction company, claimed that it had suffered overcharge from the 
members of the Bitumen cartel, namely Kuwait petrol and Shell Nederland353. In the first 
hearing, Shell Nederland contended that the proceedings are actually time-barred, as the cartel 
had become public news much earlier than the proceedings and the start of the period of 
limitations should be set to that date.354 The court in principle agreed with this position but 
further noted that, in the same news other members of the cartel were not mentioned, and that 
Van Gelder Groep could not have the required subjective knowledge to protect itself and 
allowed the furtherance of the claim. 
Extent of the damages /remoteness/Presumption of Harm 
Shell in a second attempt contended that it could not be held liable for damages as it was not 
possible to attribute the extent of the damage to each member of the cartel and therefore it was 
not possible to litigate on this basis.355 However, the court disagreed and in line with the 
Damages Directive provisions, used the presumption of harm in cartel cases, and stated that it 
was sufficient for the members of the cartel to come together and create the likelihood of damage 
to occur.356 
Causal link 
Next, the court moved to establish the causality. Van Gelder contended that besides the higher 
prices it had to pay to the cartelized undertakings, that it had also missed out on orders, therefore, 
also suffered loss of profits due to the higher prices during the cartelized period. The court took 
the Commission decision into account and stated that Commission has already established the 
cartel forming and anticompetitive effects it had on the market, and it is up to Shell et al. to 
 
352Case COMP / 38.456 – Bitumen – NL. 
353 ECLI:NL:RBROT:2018:8001, Van Gelder Groep B.V v. Shell Nederland Verkoopmaatschappij B.V. et.al. 
354 Ibid, para 7.8. 
355 Ibid, para 7.20. 
356 Ibid, para 7.21. 
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prove that Commission had made technical errors in coming to that conclusion. This issue 
remains debated at this moment.  
Against this background, the court presumed that cartels cause harm and Van Gelder as an 
operator in the same market is accepted to have suffered from the anti-competitive effect, and 
therefore, there is a causal link between the damages Van Gelder suffered and the actions of the 
cartel.357Following this establishment, the court allowed Van Gelder to the quantification 
phase.358The session for quantification is still pending, but the court pointed out the applicable 
quantification methods and so far, the Court had not encountered any conflicting national rules 
in the application of the damages directive. 
Methods of Quantification 
In the quantum phase court noted the established principles of full compensation, i.e. the victim 
to be stated into the position had the infringement not taken place, and the application of the 
method that best is comparable to the situation at hand, thereby indicating the application of the 
“comparator” models.359 At the same time court also noted that overcompensation must be 
avoided and the possibility involvement of experts in the quantum phase. Earlier in the session, 
Shell pointed out that Commission in its Bitumen Cartel decision considered that the actual 
impact of the bitumen cartel on the market is impossible to determine due to the lack of 
information, and the (net) prices evolved in the market in the absence of arrangements for the 
same reasons360. Nevertheless, the court assumed the possibility of concrete calculation of 
damages.361Furthermore, the court believed that Van Gelder could have only saved or collected 
pieces of evidence from the day the of the Commission’s decision in 2006.  Therefore in the 
beginning phase of the quantification process, if neither party has been able to sufficiently 
demonstrate the correctness of their arguments, the court will apply the comparator model in 
abstract market conditions and involved parties will be required to support and substantiate their 
arguments with pieces of evidence based on the court’s assumed conditions.362 
 
357 Ibid, paras 7.22-24. 
358 Ibid, para 7.40. 
359 Ibid, para 7.41. 
360 Case COMP / 38.456 – Bitumen – NL, para 314. 
361 Van Gelder , 7.41. 
362 Ibid, para 7.43-45. Thereby indicating combination of Simulation and comparator model. 
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Stichting Cartel Compensation v Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. et.al 
Presumption of Harm / Overcompensation 
In the follow on litigation from the Air Cartel Case of the Commission where the cartelists were 
fined a total amount of € 776 465 000 for participating in a price fixing cartel that covered flights 
from and to the EU setting the prices of fuel and security surcharges363; the so-called shippers 
who have been in business with the airliners made a total claim of 216.942,546 Euros to be paid 
from the airliners at the Amsterdam District Court.364 The shippers have given mandate to 
Stichting Cartel Compensation to lay claim for their suffered losses in from of excess charges 
during the cartel period of 2000-2006365.The excess charge was mostly made on top of the “base 
rate” the airliners used.366 The claimed amount mostly was overcharged by the Dutch flag carrier 
KLM and the Stichting Cartel Compensation requested from the court to move on to calculate 
the damage and compensate the victims of the infringement.367 However, court found that the 
case is of such a complex nature that every transaction is impossible to disconnect from other 
members of the cartel. If this motion was granted, it would have caused inconsistencies and 
possible multiple damages payment from the infringing parties. To prevent this situation, case 
was decided to be merged with different pending cases.368 
Causal Link/ Extent of the Damage 
Furthermore, the court decided not to grant the SCC’s wish for immediate move towards the 
quantification phase and instead noted that, the airliners must be given the possibility to rebut 
the claim laid by SCC, and in such possibility, SCC is required to prove before the court 
compounds of its claim namely, the causality and the extent of the suffered damage.369 During 
that procedure SCC must sufficiently established why these damages were caused by the 
airliners.  
Methods of Quantification 
 
363 2017/C 188/11— Airfreight 
364 ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2015:1780 Stichting Cartel Compensation v Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. et.al 
365 Ibid, para 3.1. 
366 Ibid, para 3.2. 
367 Ibid, para 3.1. 
368 Ibid, para 4.8. 
369 Ibid, para 4.11. 
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From this moment the court recalled the practical guide and referred to but-for method for 
quantification. 370An interesting aspect is that it was the first time, that the court used the 
possibility of quantification in abstract, thereby utilizing a combination of simulation and but-
for method. 
According to this calculation, the suffered damage will be assessed by comparison of the actual 
price charged during the cartelized timeframe to the price which they would have paid in the 
hypothetical world where no wrongdoing is assumed by the carriers. 371 
 
Cdc Project 13 Sa V Kemira Chemicals Oy 
In a follow-on action based on the Commission decision on Sodium Chlorate Cartel, where the 
commission fined the producers of Sodium Chlorate for influencing the input in the market and 
on price fixing charges, a claim vehicle CDC, was mandated to lodge a claim amounting to 61 
Million Euros for a total of twelve different purchasers.372 
Principle of effectiveness 
The Amsterdam District Court after accepting jurisdiction was tasked with the question, whether 
the claims lodged by CDC were subject to time limitations.373 Based on the Dutch Law the 
assessment had to be made under the law of the countries where the producers had their place 
of businesses. The court thoroughly reviewed each countries’ law and concluded that under the 
Slovakian, Czech and Spanish law the case was already time barred and could no longer be 
litigated. CDC objected to this decision and raised the principle of effectiveness, 374which under 
the Finnish and Swedish law it contended the claims should still be litigated. Furthermore, CDC 
contended that the claimants had only become aware of the wrongdoers after the Commission 
released its summary decision. The court pointed at the Commission press release dated in June 
2008 and thereby concluded that the claimants should have acted earlier, and the time limitations 
were still applicable and that the principle of effectiveness could not be invoked.375 
 
370 Ibidem. 
371 Ibidem. 
372 Case COMP/38.695 – Sodium Chlorate 
373 ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2017:3166 Cdc Project 13 Sa v  Kemira Chemicals Oy, 
374 Ibid, paras: 4.24, 428-4.33. 
375 Press release available at : https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_08_917 01.05.2020. 
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The case was appealed on the same grounds, to invoke the principle of effectiveness, in the 
Amsterdam Appeals Court.376 The court has overturned the district court’s decision and sent it 
back for review. The main line of argumentation Appeals court used was related to the short 
limitation periods that were applicable at the corresponding national levels. The Appeals court 
contended that limitations are contrary to the EU principle of effectiveness and stated that an 
injured party should be granted sufficient time to lodge a claim, which would mean that the 
victim should be able to wait for the Commission’s decision, and could even appeal that decision 
as a basis to lodge its claim.377  
 
East West Debt B.V., v, United Technologies Corporation, et.al 
Principle of effectiveness 
In a follow-on case based on the Commission’s decision on the “Elevator Cartel”, 378 where 
multiple elevator producers were found guilty of forming a cartel, EWD a claim vehicle, lodged 
a claim against the subsidiaries of the elevator cartel members.379 The district court of Midde-
Nederland held that while an infringement taken place at the EU level, it does not automatically 
trigger liability of the infringing party’s subsidiaries.380 
Causal link/ Damages 
The same case was appealed to the court of Arnhem-Leeuwaarden and the appeals court 
confirmed the earlier judgment.381 In its reasoning, the necessary steps for a successful tort claim 
was reiterated. According to Dutch law, the necessary requirements for a successful claim are 
an unlawful  act, relativity, damages and a causal link between the unlawful act and the damages. 
The court stated that each of these elements should be presented and where necessary rebutted 
by the infringing party in accordance with the EU principles of effectiveness and equality.382 
Extend of Harm  
 
376 ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2020:194 Cdc Project 13 Sa v  Kemira Chemicals Oy 
377 Ibid, para 3.5.4. 
378 COMP/E-1/38.823 - PO/Elevators and Escalators 
379 ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2016:4284 East West Debt B.V., v, United Technologies Corporation, et.al 
380 Ibid, para 4.10. 
381 ECLI:NL:GHARL:2019:1060 East West Debt B.V., v, United Technologies Corporation, et.al, para 6.1. 
382 Ibid, para 5.12. 
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 In its further elaboration court stated that a subsidiary which can be attributed to a part of the 
damages that its mother company has inflicted, does not necessarily entail an order to payment 
of the amount which the claim is made. Similarly, court agrees to presume that a harm was 
inflicted from the forming of a cartel but the obligation for a claimant to prove the extent of the 
damage remains and the causal link stays. In its examination, court noted that EWD has failed 
to substantiate its claim as to which party has bought in which amount a certain type of product 
from which producer. 383  
Umbrella Customers 
Noteworthy was that court also stated that EWD cannot lodge a claim for the “Umbrella” 
customers as other producers who were negatively impacted from the cartel, were not among 
the defendants.384 
4.2.Belgium 
Herman Verboven et.al. v. Honda Motor Europe Logistics  
Principle of Effectiveness 
In the longstanding “Honda”385 follow-on case, a group of parallel importers of motors laid a 
claim against Honda in 2006 for damages. In 1999 Honda was fined 750.000386 Eur for the abuse 
of its dominant position in issuing conformity certificates in the Belgian market. The decision 
became final in 2011 after being upheld by the highest appellate court, and in 2017 The 
Commercial Court of Ghent ruled in favour of compensation for damages. In the initial phases 
of the court hearings, the court was tasked with referring a preliminary question the Belgian 
Constitutional Court whether a damages claim can be subject to time limitation periods. The 
Constitutional Court ruled that competition damages cannot be time-limited and referred to a 
provision in the Damages Directive that states a national rule on limitation periods should not 
unduly hamper the bringing of actions for damages.387  
Methods of Quantification /Tasks assigned to Private enforcement 
The commercial Court of Ghent moved on to calculate the damages but decided that it is 
excessively difficult to do so as the facts of the case date back to 20+ years. Consequently, the 
 
383 Ibid, para 5.18.. 
384 Ibid, para 5.21. 
385 Herman Verboven et.al. / Honda Motor Europe Logistics. KH Ghent (A/12/02970). 
386 Belgisch Staatblad (13.03.1999) p.8239. Original fine issued to Honda was 30 Million Belgian Francs. 
387 Damages Directive (2014 ) Recital 36. 
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Court has agreed with Honda that each of the claimants may not be able to bring conclusive 
evidence; however, not granting any damages would be against the objectives of Competition 
law enforcement. The court decided to use its discretionary power its entitled under Belgian law 
based on the good faith assessment of “ex aequo et bono” and issued 20.000 Euros plus interest 
to each claimant.388 
4.3.UK 
Deutsche Bahn AG and others v Morgan Advanced Materials Plc 
In a UK follow-on case to electrical and mechanical carbon and graphite products cartel,389 
which included Morgan Advanced Materials Plc and which blew the whistle on the cartel to 
receive immunity from any fines, Deutsche Bahn AG filed claim against the cartel due to the 
losses it allegedly suffered in CAT.390 The statute of limitations regarding the original case came 
to an end on the 18th December 2008 while the follow on case was instigated on 15 December 
2010. According to the English law, a follow-on case may not be lodged until the appeal period 
of the original case, that is, the Commission’s decision. It is stated in the UK law that the time 
frame to lodge the claim is two years from the Commission’s decision. CAT was thus permitted 
to proceed with the claim. 
Statue of limitations / Principle of Effectiveness 
The case was first referred to appeals court and from there to the Supreme Court after both first 
and second instances allowed to proceed to the claim. The question directed to the Supreme 
Court was whether the follow-on case was brought on time391. According to the Supreme court 
it depended on two possible viewpoints: a) whether the Commission’s decision was viewed as 
a decision against the Morgan Advanced Materials, and b) as a decision made against all the 
cartelists which was appealed by most of them. In the former scenario the statute of limitations 
began on the 13th of February 2004, while the latter scenario considered the follow-on case on 
time. The supreme court considered that an earlier EU case has concluded this issue and any 
non-challenged decision becomes final to the addressee. Therefore, the claim was considered to 
have been lodged out of the two years period and therefore not admissible. 
 
388 Robbert Snelders et.al. The Dominance and Monopolies Review - Edition 7 p.66 
389 Case C.38.359 ñ Electrical and mechanical carbon and graphite products. 
390 CAT, 1173/5/7/10, Deutsche Bahn Ag V  Morgan Crucible Company Plc Et.Al. 
391[2012] EWCA Civ 1055,  Deutsche Bahn Ag & Ors V Morgan Crucible Company Plc & Ors, para 120. and Ibid, 
para68,(2) 
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This is a very interesting case and intriguing case for two reasons. Firstly it fully contradicts the 
earlier studied Dutch case Cdc Project 13 Sa V Kemira Chemicals Oy, where the Appeals court 
contended that limitations are contrary to the EU principle of effectiveness that any injured part 
was to have sufficient amount of time in order to lodge a claim and only this would ensure 
compliance with the EU principle of effectiveness, and secondly, it demonstrates the level of 
different interpretation between two different member states at the level of Appeal courts. 
5. Remarks based on the practical insights 
5.1.Full compensation 
The principle of full compensation remains an open issue in the court. The expectancy created 
in the court compared to the amount compensated may however be deceiving. There are many 
factors involved in obtaining full compensation, and what is “full” seems to be the extent of 
what can be proven in court or settled outside of the court. Similarly, some  defendants by 
rebuttal influence the amount of full compensation .It can also be seen from the cases 
overviewed that an initial claim of what is considered to be full can be attained in a middle way 
and considered to be compensated in full.392 Furthermore, where a damage cannot be attributed 
to an infringer, or where a causal link cannot be established to a damage that is otherwise 
existent, deadweight losses may occur. The extent of the full compensation is not clear, and it 
can be met by means other than economical. Furthermore, indirect purchasers standing while 
facilitating the corrective task serve also to complicate the determination of sufficient extent for 
full compensation by multiplying the procedure by each level of a claiming purchaser.  
 
In cases where the courts are making a great effort to clearly define the necessary elements such 
as in East West Debt B.V., v, United Technologies Corporation, et.al  where the court demanded 
from the claimant to clarify which party has bought in which amount a certain type of product 
from which producer, the damage can be substantiated as a mere economic claim and the extent 
of sufficient damages maybe possible to assess. 
 
 
392 See TenneT case (n 348). 
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5.2.Principle of Effectiveness 
The principle of effectiveness has been used in the larger meaning of “Concept of effectiveness” 
as described above. The wide interpretation creates multiple opportunities at national level to 
find grounds for claiming or defending damages. A variety of issues such as limitation periods 
can be extended or limited393, or a subsidiary may find an opportunity rebut a claim originating 
from the parent company. 
 
It is noteworthy that Norbert Reich’s assertions on hermeneutical approach on effectiveness 
holds mostly true at the national level in the in the negative meaning , where a court prohibits a 
party from claiming damages, it seeks to protect the defendant on effectiveness grounds.394 
However, there seems to be a chaos situation from the larger interpretation of “effectiveness” 
where courts are making contrary decisions, and the application of multiple tasks assigned 
private enforcement often creates confusion for involved parties. 
 
5.3.Tasks assigned to EU Competition Law 
It is apparent from the case law that the corrective task and deterrence task are realised by the 
courts interchangeably, exclusively, or combined. The fairness principle that seems to be the 
driving force behind all the assigned tasks, necessitates such application but also creates 
uncertainties such as the application of the principle of effectiveness and the right to full 
compensation in the same context. 
 
5.4.Methods of Quantification 
Quantification methods are intricate, long and maybe utilized remotely. The guidance provided 
to the courts from the Commission maps out all essential and empirical methods thoroughly. It 
seems that courts at the national level are warming up to take more responsibility and to develop 
expertise on these matters. The application of combined methods as was seen in cartel cases 
where but-for modal was accompanied with a simulation, or a simulation method where an 
 
393 Deutsche Bahn (n 390). 
394 Such as the Supreme Court of UK preventing the proceedings against Morgan Advandeced Materials Plc, whom 
made us of the EU remedie of leniency.Also in Tennet case the court is ready to listen a rebuttal from the defendant. 
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abstract world is created for simulation were noted. Furthermore, most of the countries have 
legislated to accept experts to quantification phase of damages actions. 
 
Lessons from the U.S. 
The century old private enforcement system in the federal U.S. is a relevant topic beyond doubt. 
It is even more relevant when the federal like characteristics of EU comes to mind. It was not 
so long ago that private enforcement in U.S. was also in a state of chaos. The multiple level of 
state and federal laws pertaining the matter and diverse approaches the instances preferred, 
combined with underperforming cooperation regime created a not so well functioning private 
enforcement machine.395 However, the century long experience built in the system managed to 
convert it to a polished machine only by procedural tweaks. These tweaks were embodied in the 
indirect purchasers standing and the passing-on regime. 
 
The real dimension beyond the tweaks were different. The “bottom-up” approach of the federal 
U.S. which respects the policy choices at both levels, have come to a total system failure in the 
issue of indirect purchaser standing.396 It was not before that a choice was made to ban indirect 
purchaser standing and to apply corrective justice in these cases, the system became “effective”. 
The conventional wisdom in U.S. chose for deterrence, instead of a balance between fairness, 
and effectiveness. 397In other words, U.S. system opts for a single substantive standard with a 
strongly coordinated mechanism.398 The choice, naturally is not custom made for the EU, but a 
successful and coherent private enforcement system such as that of the U.S. is readily available 
and with a policy change from multiple tasks and standards to private enforcement and a bottom-
up approach may deliver real results. A coherent Private enforcement system can contribute 
much better to Public enforcement system and deterrence.  
 
 
395 Cengiz (n154) , p.5 
396 Ibid. p. 24. 
397 Ibid p.5 
398 Ibid, p.6 
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Consensual Dispute Resolution 
In attempt to avoid legal uncertainty, consensual dispute resolution in the Damages Directive is 
relevant for this study. The procedural and remedial aspects of actions for damages is a task for 
the member states, but also alternative dispute resolution methods, such as arbitration and 
mediation. National courts are expected to ensure that each damages action is offered a 
consensual dispute resolution possibility for all involved.399 In order to further facilitate this, the 
Directive provides for the chance to suspend the limitation periods for the timeframe needed for 
ADR mechanisms400 and also for the settling co-infringers, to reduce their share of the harm 
inflicted, and the chance to no longer be liable for the remaining un-settled harm.401 
Concluding remarks 
Procedural law is a requirement to implement substantive law effectively. An effective 
enforcement system is a requirement for an effective competition policy. Coherent private 
enforcement, compliments public enforcement which in turn benefits the society. The balance 
between the latter two is sought by policy choices to determine the level of effectiveness in the 
system. These choices and their outcomes are first presented than analysed at the more practical 
level above. 
 
The policy choices in the form of tasks assigned to private enforcement is a very eager one that 
includes deterrence and corrective tasks used to achieve the objectives of both at the same time, 
while the efficiencies may lie in the use of a sole task for a sole objective. To prevent clashes 
between the tasks, compromises, i.e. preferences are necessary to make. 
 
The insights from the U.S. in this regard are valuable, mutatis mutandis, and give a robust 
example of the predictability such clear choices can bring to an antitrust enforcement system. 
More practically, the prohibition on the indirect purchaser standing and therefore the passing-
on defence, eliminates multiple levels of complexity, such as the extent of the harm and causality 
in remote claims, while the welfare of the society is protected in the larger context. 
 
399 Damages Directive (2014) , Recital 5. 
400 Ibid, Art.18. 
401 Ibid, Art 19 (1),(2). 
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For the victims of competition infringements, effectiveness principle, or the concept of 
effectiveness as studied above gives birth to the challenging procedural requirements such as 
the “right” to full compensation, which is a near impossible goal to meet. Regarding the 
determination of the extent of harm, more practical or procedural efficiencies can be found from 
secondary cases at the national level. Similarly, effective establishment of causality is an 
intricate task. In remote cartel cases when the existence of causal link is accepted due to passing-
on, settling for distribution of the infringers gains among victims is a procedural relief and also 
relevant to the system as a deterrent factor for cartelists. Methods for calculation on the other 
hand seems to have found a solid ground in the hands of the judges and NCAs. The 
developments in the field of arbitration before private enforcement is encouraging and should 
be preferred over quantification before the court as the parties can agree to quantification terms 
as well. 
 
Further clarifications can also be obtained by the courts. It is partially observed that courts are 
moving to decide on cases without clear instructions. It may produce efficiencies in the bigger 
picture to ask for more clarifications Perhaps, a collection and publication of case law from the 
member states may help avoid courts inventing the wheel again and again and prevent 
contrasting interpretations.402 
 
The U.S. experience illustrates that the emergence of a coherent and effective private 
enforcement regime depends on compromises in competition policy. The concept of 
effectiveness should also not be used unconditionally to contain national systems to comply 
with EU law. A balanced system of compromises where concept of effectiveness and national 
remedies reason to one another, is likely to produce more coherence and relief for victims as 
such. It should be bore in mind that effective application of EU law also means improving the 
quality of judicial decision-making mechanisms and a clarity in quantification of damages. The 
upcoming review of the Damages directive before the 27th of December 2020 is a good moment 
for improvement or a shift towards claimant friendly litigation culture. 
 
402 Van den Bergh (n 59), p.17.  
